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CONSTITUTIONAL COHESION AND THE RIGHT TO 
PUBLIC HEALTH* 
James G. Hodge, Jr., J.D., LL.M.** 
Daniel Aaron*** 




Despite years of significant legal improvements stemming from a renaissance in 
public health law, Americans still face major challenges and barriers in assuring 
their communal health. Reversals of legal reforms coupled with maligned policies 
and chronic underfunding contribute to diminished public health outcomes. 
Underlying preventable morbidity and mortality nationally are realities of our 
existing constitutional infrastructure. In essence, there is no general obligation of 
government to protect or promote the public’s health. Under principles of 
“constitutional cohesion,” structural facets and rights-based principles interwoven 
within the Constitution protect individuals and groups from governmental vices 
(i.e., oppression, overreaching, tyranny, and malfeasance). Structural 
impediments and rights infringements provide viable options to challenge 
governmental efforts inapposite to protecting the public’s health. Through corollary 
applications framed as auxiliary, creative, and ghost righting, courts are also 
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empowered to recognize core duties or rights that the Constitution may not 
explicitly denote, but assuredly contains, to remedy identifiable vices. Notably, 
ghost righting charts a course for recognizing a constitutional right to public 
health that Americans are owed, and government must respect, to assure basic 
public health needs. 
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INTRODUCTION
Laws have been used for centuries to address threats to the pub-
lic’s health,1 sometimes in invidious, inconsistent, or unsubstanti-
ated ways.2 In the late 1990s, however, scholars and policymakers 
began championing a “renaissance” in public health law and poli-
                                                   
 1. While historic and modern definitions of what constitutes “public health” vary ex-
tensively, for purposes of this manuscript, public health may be defined in the broadest con-
ception as “what we, as a society, do collectively to assure the conditions for people to be 
healthy.” INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 19 (1988).  
 2. See, e.g., JAMES G. HODGE, JR., PUBLIC HEALTH IN A NUTSHELL 135 (3d ed. 2018) 
[hereinafter HODGE, JR., NUTSHELL] (“In addition to public health powers to test, screen, 
treat, and vaccinate . . . [s]ocial distancing powers including quarantine, isolation, curfew, 
and closure are among the oldest (and some may say the most antiquated) public health 
measures. Although wielded historically in ways that occasionally castigated affected persons, 
social distancing powers are not punitive per se.”).
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cy.3 Bolstered by new and progressive definitions of the field,4 pub-
lic health laws moved beyond traditional boundaries focused typi-
cally on controlling infectious diseases to serve as distinct tools to 
promote communal health with greater respect for individual 
rights. Antiquated federal, state, and local laws featuring heavy-
handed approaches under the guise of public health were amend-
ed or dispelled. Enlightened model law approaches5 and jurispru-
dence increasingly reflected a balance of communal and individual 
interests to reach a legal equilibrium that, in turn, contributed to 
tangible health outcomes. 
To date, the public health law renaissance has unquestionably 
altered perceptions of the role of law to improve health outcomes 
through extensive, revolutionary legal and policy reforms. These 
reforms and their public health benefits, however, are at signifi-
cant risk. Rollbacks, rescissions, and repudiations of solidified pub-
lic health principles and “best practices” dominate political agen-
das at all levels of government.6 National health law reforms are 
under siege, spearheaded by proposed repeals7 or judicial under-
mining8 of the Affordable Care Act (ACA),9 which extended health 
                                                   
 3. Lawrence O. Gostin, Public Health Law: A Renaissance, 30 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 136, 
137 (2002) (calling for conformity among modern scientific and legal standards, consistency 
in efforts among states, and uniformity in approaching diverse public health threats through 
law); Lawrence O. Gostin, F. Ed Thompson & Frank P. Grad, The Law and the Public’s Health: 
The Foundations, in LAW IN PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE 42 (Richard A. Goodman et al. eds., 2d 
ed. 2007) (“Public health law is experiencing a period of renaissance in the United States.”). 
 4. Professor Gostin defines public health law as “the study of the legal powers and du-
ties of the state . . . to ensure the conditions for people to be healthy (to identify, prevent, 
and ameliorate risks to health in the population) and of the limitations on the power of the 
state to constrain for the common good the autonomy, privacy, liberty, proprietary, and 
other legally protected interests of individuals.” LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW:
POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 4 (2d ed. 2008). Professor Parmet notes, “[p]ublic health law . . . 
focuses on the authority of government agencies charged with protecting public health as 
well as the rights of individuals subject to such regulations.” WENDY E. PARMET,
POPULATIONS, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE LAW 212 (2009). Based on these approaches, public 
health law is defined for purposes of this manuscript as: “laws (e.g., constitutional, statutory, 
regulatory, judicial), legal processes, or policies at every level of government (e.g., federal, 
tribal, state, local) that: (1) are primarily designed to assure the conditions for people to be 
healthy; or (2) concern structural or rights-based limitations on the powers of government 
to act in the interests of communal health.” HODGE, JR., NUTSHELL, supra note 2, at 14. 
 5. See TURNING POINT MODEL STATE PUB. HEALTH ACT § 1-101 (2003); see also James G. 
Hodge, Jr. et al., Transforming Public Health Law: The Turning Point Model State Public Health 
Act, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 77, 77 (2006) [hereinafter Hodge, Jr. et al., Transforming Public 
Health Law]. 
 6. James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., Emerging Legal Threats to the Public’s Health, 46 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 547 (2018). 
 7. See C. STEPHEN REDHEAD & JANET KINZER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LEGISLATIVE 
ACTIONS IN THE 112TH, 113TH, AND 114TH CONGRESSES TO REPEAL, DEFUND, OR DELAY THE 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (Feb. 7, 2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43289.pdf.  
 8. Texas v. United States, 352 F. Supp. 3d 665 (N. D. Tex. 2018) (holding that the 
ACA is an unconstitutional exercise of Congressional authority absent an effective tax penal-
ty for the ACA’s individual mandate provision following Congress’ 2017 enactment of the 
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act); see also Paul Krugman, Op-ed: Conservatism’s Monstrous Endgame, N.Y.
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care access and coverage to millions of Americans. Public health 
sciences are debunked or outright ignored in favor of private in-
dustry interests10 or draconian threats of criminal sanctions in re-
sponse to public health crises.11 Each of the last five years is among 
the hottest ever in recorded history, yet federal authorities blatant-
ly ignore environmental interventions.12 Deregulatory efforts in 
health care, housing, and education are reversing decades of pub-
lic health achievements and gains to address health disparities and 
social determinants of health. Preemptive efforts stymying state 
and local public health legal innovations are a common tactic 
among some federal and state lawmakers.13 Prevailing federal and 
state health and tax policies favoring the wealthy fall hard on lower 
and middle classes diminishing their ability to lead healthy lives.14
Even as national expenditures on health care costs continue to 
rise to unprecedented levels,15 public health budgets at all levels of 
government have been decimated.16 A grossly underfunded and 
underperforming public health system allows for the spread of 
communicable diseases and the rise of some chronic conditions 
and injuries.17 Consequently, many Americans are sinking deeper 
into a cesspool of preventable poor health outcomes. Life expec-
                                                   
TIMES, Dec. 18, 2018, at A22 (“What Nancy Pelosi called the ‘monstrous endgame’ of the 
Republican assault on health care is just the leading edge of an attack on multiple fronts, as 
the G.O.P. tries to overturn the will of the voters and undermine democracy in general.”). 
 9. 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2010). 
 10. Lawrence O. Gostin et al., Politics “Trumps” Health in America, O’NEILL INSTITUTE
(July 23, 2018), http://oneill.law.georgetown.edu/politics-trumps-health-in-america/ (“[I]t 
seems politics trumps health, emboldened by a President and his Cabinet appointees who 
prioritize the rich over the poor and big business over healthy communities.”).
 11. Lawrence O. Gostin, James G. Hodge, Jr. & Chelsea L. Gulinson, Supervised Injection 
Facilities Legal and Policy Reforms, 321 JAMA 745, 746 (2019) (quoting Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral Rod Rosenstein “[Jurisdictions] should expect [DOJ] to meet the opening of any [Su-
pervised Injection Facilities] with swift and aggressive action.”). 
 12. John Schwartz & Nadja Popovich, 2018 Continues Warming Trend, As 4th Hottest Year 
Since 1880, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2019, at A1. 
 13. James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., Public Health Preemption Plus, 45 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 156, 
156 (2017) (preemptive efforts “include political posturing and legal efforts to directly 
threaten state or local public agencies or officials, withdraw or deny local funds, and strip 
regulatory authorities”). 
 14. Robert Pear et al., Trump to Scrap Critical Health Care Subsidies, Hitting Obamacare 
Again, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/12/us/politics/
trump-obamacare-executive-order-health-insurance.html.  
 15. Robert Pear, Growth of Health Care Spending Slowed Last Year, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/06/us/politics/us-health-spending-2017.html 
(noting that health spending in the U.S. equaled $3.5 trillion last year, up 3.9% from 2016, 
or about $10,740 a person, and nearly 18% of the gross domestic product).  
 16. David Himmelstein & Steffie Woolhandler, Public Health’s Falling Share of US Spend-
ing, 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 56 (2016) (“Public health’s share of total health expenditures 
[was] 3.18% in 2002, [but] then fell to 2.65% in 2014; it is projected to fall to 2.40% in 
2023.”). 
 17. Id.
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tancy among all Americans, notably specific subpopulations,18 has 
actually gone down for the first time in decades.19 Today’s youth 
may live shorter lives than their parents due largely to public 
health failures nationally. 
Changes in laws and policies threaten the continuity of the 
modern public health law renaissance absent aggressive efforts to 
realign national and regional priorities to further communal 
health.20 Diminutions in American public health outcomes, howev-
er, are not a foregone conclusion thanks to affirmative counter-
efforts of legislators, policymakers, ethicists, and scholars. Collec-
tively, they are generating an array of hard and soft law approaches 
to advance communal health. Legislatures articulate multiple prin-
ciples supporting government’s obligations to counter specific 
public health threats.21 Policymakers promote a litany of interven-
tions, including suing and shaming government officials, to ad-
vance public health.22 Ethicists conceptualize practical models of 
public health ethics that require or support governmental respon-
sibilities.23 Human rights advocates push for greater respect for 
rights-based access to basic health services.24 Enhanced notions of 
principles of health equity and justice foster fairness in public 
health and health care services across populations.25
                                                   
 18. Bindu Kalesan et al., Cross-sectional Study of Loss of Life Expectancy at Different Ages Re-
lated to Firearm Deaths Among Black and White Americans, 24 BMJ EVIDENCE-BASED MED., 1,1 
(2018) (documenting how life expectancies for African Americans are actually several years 
less than for Caucasian Americans due mostly to public health impacts of gun violence on 
African Americans).  
 19. Jennifer Karas Montez, Deregulation, Devolution, and State Preemption Laws’ Impact on 
US Mortality Trends, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1749, 1749 (2017) (citing the National Center 
for Health Statistics, “between 2014 and 2015, life expectancy at birth for the nation as a 
whole declined by 0.1 years”). 
 20. James G. Hodge, Jr., Revisiting the Renaissance in Public Health Law, 46 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 1031, 1033 (2019) (“For the renaissance to thrive . . . public and private actors 
should reconsider how law may accomplish varied ends without constraining its capacity to 
address multifarious challenges.”). 
 21. Hodge, Jr., et al., Transforming Public Health Law, supra note 5, at 77–79.
 22. Lance Gable & James W. Buehler, Criticized, Fired, Sued, or Prosecuted: Hindsight and 
Public Health Accountability, 132 PUB. HEALTH REP. 676, 676 (2017) (following the Flint water 
crisis the director of the Michigan state health department and others were publically criti-
cized, sued, and prosecuted). 
 23. See, e.g., Nancy E. Kass, An Ethics Framework for Public Health, 91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
1776 (2001); James C. Thomas et al., A Code of Ethics for Public Health, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
1057 (2002); James Childress et al., Public Health Ethics: Mapping the Terrain, 30 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 170, 175–76 (2002).  
 24. Lawrence O. Gostin et al., Seventy Years of Human Rights in Global Health: Drawing on 
a Contentious Past to Secure a Hopeful Future, 392 LANCET 2731 (2018).  
 25. Sandro Galea, The Real Reason Why American Lives Are Getting Shorter, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/opinion-life-expectancy-
americans_us_ 5c098 2b0e4b0b6cdaf5d37c8 (stating that the opioid epidemic emerges from 
the social, economic, and political context of contemporary American life, and without ad-
dressing this context, the problem will not be solved); cf. MADISON POWERS & RUTH FADEN,
SOCIAL JUSTICE: THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND HEALTH POLICY (2006).
178 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 53:1 
These meaningful efforts are influential and impactful, especial-
ly within certain populations. Yet, they are also collectively insuffi-
cient to assure Americans’ public health needs. Legal patches and 
ethical aspirations alone do not administer vaccines, conduct dis-
ease surveillance, provide basic treatments, or assure other core 
public health services.26 They do not prevent government inaction 
amidst public health crises or fairly allocate benefits and risks 
across populations. While some governmental entities, particularly 
at the state and local levels, may choose to legally act to provide 
core functions, many do not. With divergent views among the 
courts, government leaders too often stand idle as populations suf-
fer from largely preventable conditions (e.g., infectious diseases, 
obesity, addiction, injuries). Preventing or proactively addressing 
these conditions early on would take pennies on the dollar com-
pared to the costs of resulting harms and associated treatments. 
Despite the enormous achievements extending from the public 
health law renaissance, clear and substantial risks to population 
health remain. This failure of the renaissance reflects an interpre-
tive reality of our existing constitutional infrastructure. In essence,
there is no affirmative obligation of government to protect or promote the 
public’s health. Except in special cases, government does not have to 
act to assure the health of communities through provision of basic 
public health services. As a result, from a constitutional point of 
view, any benefits societies derive from public health interventions 
are subject to the whim of governmental authorities. Lacking con-
stitutional requirements to act, populations are left riding a roller 
coaster of selective, fleeting interventions determined by ever-
changing administrations. 
Americans should not have to endure such indignities and 
threats to their health. Yet, solutions to the paucity and discontinu-
ity of public health services are elusive because of a lack of consti-
tutional support for basic public health services. Just because the 
                                                   
 26. What constitutes “core public health services” is subject to identification and re-
finement for purposes of setting legally-recognized duties. Traditional public health services 
include epidemiological investigations, testing, screening, surveillance, vaccination, social 
distancing measures, inspections, and nuisance abatement. Cf. HODGE, JR., NUTSHELL, supra
note 2, at 11–12, 26. These services, however, do not reflect the scope of modern public 
health interventions designed to assure conditions for people to be healthy. Cf. INSTITUTE 
OF MEDICINE, THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 19 (1988). The federal Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) describes ten essential public health services that all com-
munities should engage in addressing social determinants of health inequities (SDOH). 
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, THE TEN ESSENTIAL PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES 
(2014), https://www.cdc.gov/publichealthgateway/publichealthservices/pdf/essential-
phs.pdf. These services include monitoring community health through active health assess-
ments; addressing social and structural determinants of health inequities through collabora-
tive, outreach, and education efforts; ensuring a competent health care workforce; and 
evaluating service program effectiveness.  
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Constitution does not explicitly provide for communal health 
rights does not mean that such rights do not exist. Crafting a 
broader right to public health entails nuanced or ephemeral in-
terpretations of constitutionally-grounded concepts embedded in 
its structure and other norms. Consistent with defined principles 
of “constitutional cohesion”27 and corollary applications of these prin-
ciples known as “ghost righting,”28 courts are empowered to recog-
nize or create core duties or rights that the Constitution may not 
explicitly denote, but assuredly contains. That constitutional obli-
gations of government to protect the public’s health can arise al-
most from “thin air” may seem fanciful,29 but it is viable when nec-
essary to address known governmental vices (e.g., oppression, 
overreaching, tyranny, malfeasance).30
As addressed in the sections below, crafting an affirmative “con-
stitutional right to public health” in theory (Part I) and application 
(Part II) is not merely about sustaining a renaissance in public 
health law. Rather, it is about crafting a new assessment of the 
breadth of constitutional interpretation (Part III) essential to avert 
the specter of preventable morbidity and mortality through the 
generation of an original “right to public health” (Part IV) benefit-
ting all Americans in the twenty-first century. 
I. CONSTITUTIONAL COHESION: IN THEORY
Determining that government has an affirmative legal duty to 
protect and promote the public’s health is invariably tied to the 
U.S. Constitution based on (1) its structure and (2) the rights it 
protects. First, constitutional structural arguments grounded in 
principles of federalism, separation of powers, and preemption 
surface in light of interjurisdictional disputes and policies. Protect-
ing the public’s health is a primary (even if unstated) function of 
government at all levels (federal, state, local) and branches (legis-
lative, executive, judicial). As governments seek to respond to this 
essential function, structural conflicts between different levels and 
divisions invariably arise. 
                                                   
 27. See infra Parts II and III. 
 28. See infra Part IV. 
 29. Sometimes even “fanciful” ideas emerging from popular discourse become main-
stream, including calls for greater access to health care services enveloped in “Medicare for 
All” proposals surfacing again as campaign platforms for the 2020 Presidential election. See
Maggie Astor, Once Radical, Now Mainstream: Explaining Shifts in Discourse, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
25, 2019, at A18. 
 30. See infra Part I, Figure 2. 
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Second, while governmental public health agencies routinely 
encourage voluntary, positive changes in individual or community 
health behaviors, they are also empowered legally to mandate pub-
lic health efforts among private individuals and entities.31 Conse-
quently, mandatory public health powers regularly implicate rights-
based constitutional principles, including due process, equal pro-
tection, or freedoms of speech, assembly, and religion.32
That public health law entails structural and rights-based consti-
tutional concepts is obvious. Less clear is how best to assess and 
apply them. Legal scholars, judges, policymakers, practitioners, 
and students are apt to separate structural and rights-based consti-
tutional arguments when considering or challenging varied public 
health laws.33 This makes intuitive sense. Discrete constitutional ar-
guments flow logically from the nature of a purported violation. 
For example, when one level of government intrudes on the inter-
ests of another level, infringements are often framed in terms of 
federalism.34 If Congress attempts to legislate in an area of public 
health typically reserved to states via the Tenth Amendment,35 fed-
eralism arguments by offended states may naturally follow.36
Conversely, when government acts under the guise of public 
health to derail or infringe on individual interests, rights-based ob-
jections emerge. If a state-level public health agency seeks to use its 
social distancing powers (e.g., quarantine, isolation, curfews) that 
unjustifiably infringe on a person’s freedom of movement, an indi-
vidual may raise liberty-based objections extending from principles 
of substantive or procedural due process.37
These intuitive constitutional responses, however, are not always 
the norm. Historical and modern conceptions of constitutional cohe-
sion support how structural facets and rights-based principles are 
                                                   
 31. See HODGE, JR., NUTSHELL, supra note 2, at 85 (citing ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE 
POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 3–4 (1904)). Most state and local pub-
lic health powers are derived from the “police powers,” historically defined as “the inherent 
authority of the state to enact laws and promulgate regulations to protect, preserve and 
promote the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the people.”  
 32. Cf. GOSTIN, supra note 4, at 85–86. 
 33. Ozan O. Varol, Structural Rights, 105 GEO. L.J. 1001, 1054 (2017) (pigeonholing 
“structures” and “rights” into distinct buckets negates the opportunity to examine how to fit 
them into a coherent, harmonious whole). 
 34. HODGE, JR., NUTSHELL, supra note 2, at 33–39. 
 35. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“[T]he powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to 
the people.”). 
 36. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding it is outside Congress’ com-
merce power to determine criminal sanctions for the mere possession of firearms near 
school zones). 
 37. See, e.g., Kirk v. Wyman, 65 S.E. 387 (S.C. 1909) (striking down a quarantine order 
served on an elderly woman with leprosy in part because she was removed from her home to 
an unsafe pesthouse without justification given her lack of infectivity). 
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interwoven within the fabric of federal or state constitutions38 (see
Figure 1). 
FIGURE 1. CONSTITUTIONAL COHESION
The concept is derived from expressed views among constitutional 
Framers, legal scholars, policymakers, and courts assessing how var-
ied constitutional principles work in tandem to stabilize govern-
ments and preserve individual freedoms. In San Antonio Independent 
School District v. Rodriguez (1973),39 the Supreme Court links federal-
ism with assessments of principles of equal protection.40 In Printz v. 
United States (1997),41 it cites the Federalist Papers supporting its 
proposition that constitutional structural components (e.g., sepa-
ration of powers and federalism) are both designed to protect in-
dividual liberty.42 The Court equates structural provisions in Na-
                                                   
 38. Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1531 
(1991) (advocating for the use of an “ordered liberty” model to approach issues of separa-
tion of powers to further the purpose of protecting citizens from tyranny. Principles of or-
dered liberty assimilate constitutional cohesion to the extent they acknowledge how struc-
tural and rights-based provisions align). 
 39. 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding Texas’ school financing system did not violate equal 
protection because the system assured a basic education for every child via state contribu-
tions to each district and was not the product of purposeful discrimination against any 
class).
 40. Id. at 43. 
[E]very claim arising under the Equal Protection Clause has implications for the 
relationship between national and state power under our federal system. Ques-
tions of federalism are always inherent in the process of determining whether a 
State’s laws are to be accorded the traditional presumption of constitutionality, or 
are to be subjected instead to rigorous judicial scrutiny. 
 41. 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (invalidating firearm purchase background checks required by 
federal law to be conducted by state officials as unconstitutional). 
 42. Id. at 921.  
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tional Labor Relations Board v. Canning (2014)43 as “no less critical to 
preserving liberty than the later adopted provisions of the Bill of 
Rights.”44 Some Framers, intimates the Court, assert that the Bill of 
Rights is unnecessary on the premise that existing constitutional 
provisions providing checks and balances are sufficient to protect 
individual liberties.45
Multiple scholars concur. Professor J. Harvie Wilkinson argues 
that there is no firewall between structure and rights: “guarantees 
of rights and principles of structure are sprinkled throughout [the 
Constitution].”46 The Framers’ vision centered on the primacy of 
democratic processes and the premise that state sovereignty is only 
achievable if structural- and rights-based provisions of the Constitu-
tion align.47 Professor Akhil Reed Amar suggests that structure and 
rights are tightly interwoven.48 “Structural overtones” like federal-
ism are vital to protecting liberty interests from governmental 
overreaching.49
The intersection of constitutional structural foundations and 
rights is undeniable because they are designed to accomplish pri-
marily the same end: protect individuals and groups from identifiable 
government vices.50 Government acts (or omissions) constituting vic-
es are universally disdained by law- and policy-makers as well as the 
public. Consequently, governmental vices are constitutionally sus-
ceptible to diminution or extinction. These vices, forged from 
common law traditions and Framers’ original perspectives, include 
governmental acts of oppression, overreaching, tyranny, and mal-
feasance (see Figure 2),51 as defined and explained below. 
                                                   
 43. 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014) (holding that president’s recess appointments, made in 
three days between two pro forma sessions of the U.S. Senate, violated the Recess Appoint-
ments Clause). 
 44. Id. at 2593.
 45. Id.; THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 435 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) 
(To the extent structural components sufficiently protect individual liberties, the Bill of 
Rights arguably allows claims to more powers than those explicitly enumerated by the Con-
stitution.). 
 46. J. Harvie Wilkinson, Our Structural Constitution, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1687, 1691, 1707 
(2004) (arguing that the structure of the Constitution is largely disregarded in favor of a 
rights-based view).  
 47. Id.
 48. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1132 (1991) 
(“A close look at the Bill [of Rights] reveals structural ideas tightly interconnected with lan-
guage of rights.”).  
 49. See, id.
 50. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 453 (1991) (quoting Atascadero State 
Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)) (“The ‘constitutionally mandated balance of 
power’ between the States and the Federal Government was adopted by the Framers to en-
sure the protection of ‘our fundamental liberties.’”).  
 51. Based in part on THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison).  
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FIGURE 2. GOVERNMENTAL VICES
A. Oppression 
Oppression refers to the undue exercise of power via governmen-
tal imposition of unwarranted burdens.52 The Framers clearly rec-
ognized the need to protect individuals against governmental op-
pression53 through an independent judiciary and principles of 
substantive due process.54 Regarding expansive notions of the con-
cept of liberty, Justice Cardozo notes in Palko v. Connecticut (1937)55
“it was recognized [long ago] that liberty is something more than 
exemption from physical restraint, and that even in the field of 
substantive rights and duties the legislative judgment, if oppressive 
and arbitrary, may be overridden by the courts.”56
In Chambers v. Florida (1940), the Court holds that when police 
officers “turn their questioning into an instrument of mental op-
                                                   
 52. Oppression, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1910) (defining oppression as “[t]he 
misdemeanor committed by a public officer, who under color of his office, wrongfully in-
flicts upon any person any bodily harm, imprisonment, or other injury”). 
 53. Judicial independence “is equally requisite to guard the Constitution and the rights 
of individuals from the effects of those ill humours, which” can, at times, lead to seri-
ous oppressions of the minor party in the community. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 395 (Alex-
ander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). 
 54. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 18, at 91 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) 
(“Shame and oppression erelong awaken their love of liberty.”); Treigle v. Acme Homestead 
Assoc., 297 U.S. 189, 197 (1936) (holding that the police power “must be exercised for an 
end which is in fact public and the means adopted must be reasonably adapted to the ac-
complishment of that end and must not be arbitrary or oppressive”). 
 55. 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (holding that a state law allowing the prosecution to appeal the 
results of a criminal conviction by jury trial does not violate the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment).  
 56. Id. at 327. 
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pression” they violate constitutionally protected rights.57 In South-
west Telephone v. Danaher (1915), a utility regulation is deemed un-
constitutional because the fine imposed on the company was “so 
oppressive as to be nothing short of a takings,” depriving defend-
ants of property rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.58
Courts are often bastions against oppressive acts of government, 
but can sometimes acquiesce. In the Supreme Court’s infamous 
decision in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896),59 racial segregation is held law-
ful on the premise that Fourteenth Amendment protections did 
not extend to social rights violations. In the notorious World War 
II case, Korematsu v. United States (1944),60 the Court upholds Presi-
dent Roosevelt’s order for the internment of Japanese Americans. 
These outlier decisions disregarding oppressive acts are “stain[s] 
on American jurisprudence,”61 that have subsequently been over-
turned.
B. Overreaching 
Legally distinct from oppression is the vice of overreaching, or the 
wrongful exercise of power outside of established limits, particular-
ly structural limits like separation of powers. Any branch of gov-
ernment, legislative, executive, or judicial, may engage in over-
reaching. Courts, however, seem particularly concerned about 
their capacity to overreach inapposite to separation of powers limi-
tations. In Degen v. United States (1996),62 Justice Kennedy explains. 
“The extent of [judicial powers] must be delimited with care, for 
there is a danger of overreaching when one branch of the Gov-
ernment, without the benefit of cooperation or correction from 
                                                   
 57. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citing 
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940)). 
 58. 238 U.S. 482, 491 (1915) (invalidating $3,600 fine imposed on a telephone compa-
ny for suspending patron service under established and uncontested regulations as arbitrary 
and oppressive). 
 59. 163 U.S. 537, 541 (1896), abrogated by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 60. 323 U.S. 214, 227 (1944), overruled by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (“Ko-
rematsu was gravely wrong the day it was decided, has been overruled in the court of history, 
and—to be clear—has no place in law under the Constitution.”).  
 61. Carl Takei, The Incarceration of Japanese Americans in World War II Does Not Provide a 
Legal Cover for a Muslim Registry, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2016), https://www.latimes.com/
opinion/op-ed/la-oe-takei-constitutionality-of-japanese-internment-20161127-story.html; see 
also Richard A. Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent, 48 DUKE L.J. 243 (1998) (de-
fining anti-canon as a term for cases which are so flawed that they are now taken as exem-
plars of bad legal decision making, such as Lochner, Plessy, and Korematsu). 
 62. 517 U.S. 820 (1996) (holding that the fugitive disentitlement doctrine did not per-
mit the district court to enter summary judgment in favor of the government in a civil forfei-
ture case, on grounds that the claimant was outside the U.S. and could not be extradited to 
face federal drug charges).  
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the others, undertakes to define its own authority.” In the Supreme 
Court’s death penalty case, Furman v. Georgia (1972),63 then Justice 
Rehnquist elucidates further in dissent: “[w]hile overreaching by 
the Legislative and Executive Branches may result in the sacrifice 
of individual protections that the Constitution was designed to se-
cure against action of the State, judicial overreaching may result in 
sacrifice of the equally important right of the people to govern 
themselves.”64
In the 2016 abortion rights case, Hodes & Nauser, MDs, P.A. v. 
Schmidt,65 concurring Judge Gordon Atcheson of the Kansas Court 
of Appeals eloquently calls for exacting judicial review related to 
Kansas’ constitutional right to self-determination. “Doing other-
wise,” he concludes, “vaults legislation ahead of an elemental consti-
tutional barrier to governmental overreach, undercutting the very pur-
pose of a bill of rights in shielding a select set of fundamental 
precepts from the vicissitudes of politics and the cravenness of pol-
iticians” (emphasis added).66 As per the court, corrections for legis-
lative overreach find their source through judicial adherence to 
fundamental constitutional norms. 
C. Tyranny 
Tyranny refers to the excessive accumulation and use of powers 
in a singular entity.67 The Framers recognized the threat that tyr-
anny poses to individual liberty and freedoms.68 To guard against it, 
society must be protected generally against oppression by its lead-
ers, and minorities must not be subjected to the unfettered will of 
majorities.69
                                                   
 63. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) (invalidating the death penalty, as customarily 
prescribed and implemented, based on a violation of cruel and unusual punishments pro-
hibited via the Eighth Amendment).  
 64. Id. at 470. 
 65. 368 P.3d 667 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016) (holding that the Kansas Constitution’s Bill of 
Rights provides the same protection for abortion rights as the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution).  
 66. Id. at 328. 
 67. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 245 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (denoting 
“[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, 
whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may just-
ly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny”). Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary defines 
tyranny as (1) “oppressive power,” inherently having some external effect, and (2) “a gov-
ernment in which absolute power is vested in a single ruler,” focusing just on accumulation 
of power. Tyranny, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
tyranny (last visited Mar. 4, 2019). 
 68. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (not-
ing that if one branch exercises powers assigned to another branch, resulting laws would be 
arbitrary and in contravention of principles of liberty). 
 69. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 at 266–67 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). 
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Justice Kennedy clarifies in Loving v. United States (1998)70 that 
deterrence of tyranny is one “reason for dispersing the federal 
power among three branches.”71 “Even before the birth of this 
country,” he notes, separation of powers is known as an effective 
“defense against tyranny.”72 Justice O’Connor attributes structural 
federalism with alleviating the risks of tyranny in Gregory v. Ashcroft
(1991): “[j]ust as the separation and independence of the coordi-
nate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the ac-
cumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy bal-
ance of power between the States and the Federal Government will 
reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.”73 Tyranny 
flourishes when government abdicates its responsibility to assure 
proper checks and balances. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has 
clarified and reigned in unfettered executive power.74 In his con-
curring opinion in Department of Transportation v. Association of Amer-
ican Railroads (2015),75 Justice Thomas, quoting William Black-
stone’s commentaries on the English Constitution, characterizes a 
tyrannical government “as one in which ‘the right both of making 
and of enforcing the laws . . . is vested in one and the same [per-
son], or one and the same body of [people].’”76 Still, as with op-
pression, the Court has at times endorsed or permitted excessive 
executive powers. In Trump v. Hawaii (2018), it affirms an immi-
gration policy targeting vulnerable minorities on the premise that 
the judiciary lacks the capacity to question executive branch judg-
ments.77 Cases like these illustrate the complexities of limiting tyr-
anny against the backdrop of core separation of powers principles. 
                                                   
 70. 517 U.S. 748 (1996) (Separation-of-powers principles do not preclude Congress 
from delegating its constitutional authority to the President to define aggravating factors 
that permit imposition of statutory penalty of death in military capital cases.). 
 71. Id. at 757. 
 72. Id. at 756. It is a “basic principle of our constitutional scheme that one branch of 
the Government may not intrude upon the central prerogatives of another.” Id. at 757.
 73. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (holding that Missouri state judges 
constitute appointees “on a policymaking level,” within the meaning of exclusion to Federal 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act; consequently, Missouri Constitution’s mandatory 
retirement provision for judges does not violate equal protection).  
 74. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 72 S. Ct. 863, 868 (1952) (invalidating 
Presidential Executive Order No. 10340 directing the Secretary of Commerce to take posses-
sion of and operate most of the nation’s steel mills). 
 75. 135 S. Ct. 1225 (2015) (finding Amtrak is a governmental entity, rather than au-
tonomous private entity, for purposes of determining the validity of metrics and standards 
created under Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act). 
 76. Id. at 1244. Justice Thomas notes that separation of powers is in direct opposition to 
tyranny as espoused by the Framers, citing FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison). 
 77. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2419 (2018) (upholding a travel ban for entry 
of nationals of Muslim countries as within the President’s statutory authority and First 
Amendment Establishment Clause); Elizabeth Goiten, Trump v. Hawaii: Giving Pretext a Pass,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (June 27, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/trump-v-
hawaii-giving-pretext-pass (explaining that courts lack authority to question executive deci-
sions regarding immigration or national security). 
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D. Malfeasance 
Malfeasance represents an amalgam of reprehensible govern-
mental abuses. Generally stated, it relates to unlawful or corrupt 
acts by governmental agents or within governmental entities.78
Some examples of malfeasance extend from positive actions;79 oth-
ers relate to abject failures.80 Traditionally, courts do not consist-
ently distinguish between positive acts and omissions in labeling 
fault.81 Malfeasance may thus arise where a governmental agent or 
entity acts inappropriately or fails to act when required or obligat-
ed to do so.82
Drawing distinctions over governmental acts or omissions as the 
source of malfeasance may seem non-purposeful when harm to the 
public’s health is at stake. Still, the Supreme Court has historically 
centered on this distinction at least for purposes of assessing liabil-
ity. In Dalehite v. United States (1953), it rejects the notion that the 
federal government is liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act 
“for failure to impose a quarantine” in a hypothetical disease out-
break.83 In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services
(1989), it holds that liberty interests under substantive due process 
do not require county employees to act to protect minors at risk of 
                                                   
 78. In the context of tort law, misfeasance may be defined as “an act which a reasonably 
prudent person would not do, or failing to do something which a reasonably prudent per-
son would do.” Brian D. Bender, Torts: The Failings of the Misfeasance/Nonfeasance Distinction 
and the Special Relationship Requirement in the Criminal Acts of Third Persons—State v. Back, 37 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 390, 391 (2010) (quoting Lewis v. Razzberries, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 437, 
441 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)).
 79. Malfeasance is characterized by performing an act one should not perform. See Ac-
tions and Remedies Against Government Units and Public Officers for Nonfeasance, 11 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 101, 105, n. 71 (1979).
 80. Nonfeasance is commonly defined as a failure to act most often pursuant to an ob-
ligation to do so. See id. at 103. Some theorize, however, that nonfeasance includes omissions 
even in the absence of a duty to act. See, e.g., Bender, supra note 78, at 391.  
 81. Compare Smith v. Iowa City, 239 N.W. 29 (Iowa 1931) (holding that a municipal 
agency’s failure to maintain safe park conditions was nonfeasance, not malfeasance), with 
Commercial News Co. v. Beard, 116 Ill. App. 501 (1904) (holding that the government’s 
failure to enforce a gambling law was misfeasance, not nonfeasance). These inconsistencies 
are problematic when analyzing tort liability. Through sovereign immunity, “absent an ex-
press statutory duty [and] voluntary exercise of . . . authority,” governmental entities are 
generally not liable for nonfeasance. Singleton v. City of Hamilton, 515 N.E.2d 8 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1986); see also James Fleming, Jr., Tort Liability of Government Units and Their Officers, 22 
U. CHI. L. REV. 610, 622 (1955). 
 82. As Justice Harlan dissents in Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132 (1891), citing com-
mentary from English common law related to the liability of corporate officers for breaches 
of trust: “[i]n this respect they may be guilty of acts of commission or omission, of malfea-
sance or non-feasance.” Id. at 172. Disagreements among courts related to these terms have 
led some legal theorists to claim distinctions are “hopeless.” Paul T. Wangerin, Actions and 
Remedies Against Government Units and Public Officers for Nonfeasance, 11 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 101, 
102 (1979). 
 83. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 44 (1953) (“To impose liability for the al-
leged nonfeasance of the Coast Guard would be like holding the United States liable in tort 
for failure to impose a quarantine for, let us say, an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease.”).  
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child abuse.84 In a forceful dissent, Justice Brennan argues that 
precedent suggests a governmental entity “may be found complicit 
in an injury even if it did not create the situation that caused the 
harm.”85 As he acknowledges in his majority opinion in Owen v. City 
of Independence (1980), liability is vital in “vindicating cherished 
constitutional guarantees,” especially “when the wrongdoer is the 
institution that has been established to protect the very rights it has 
transgressed.”86 By this logic, liability deters government malfea-
sance based on action or inaction. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL COHESION: IN APPLICATION
A primary objective underlying recognition of principles of con-
stitutional cohesion is to better assess how legal challenges are, or 
may be, used strategically to confront legal and policy approaches 
threatening public health and safety. Can cohesive principles gen-
erate new strategies to counter or challenge an increasing array of 
federal, state, and local laws supporting actions or omissions that 
are antithetical to the public’s health? 
Beyond theory, the promise of constitutional cohesion in practice 
relates to greater stability to mitigate changing governmental rela-
tionships or significant affronts to individual rights that contravene 
public health promotion. As Professor Rebecca Brown prognosti-
cated in 1991, the intersection of structural principles of separa-
tion of powers and individual rights with due process brings “a wel-
come coherence to the law developing around the body of the 
Constitution, and [helps] to ensure the future balance of govern-
ment powers in a changing nation.”87
Such bold assurances presuppose that applications of constitu-
tional cohesion are predictable and constant. In actuality, they fluc-
tuate over time, along with pendulum-like shifts in understanding 
and interpreting structural principles and individual rights. As Pro-
fessor Wendy Parmet notes, for decades courts tended to discount 
                                                   
 84. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Social Serv., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). Later, in 
Castle Rock v. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. 748 (2005), the Court rejected application of property inter-
ests via due process to require county law officers to enforce a restraining order designed to 
protect a woman and her children from an abusive spouse/father.  
 85. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 207. Consistent with Justice Brennan’s view, one commentator 
suggests governing bodies should be liable for actions or omissions, irrespective of categori-
zation, that “play[] a part in the creation or exacerbation of a social problem.” Jenna Mac-
Naughton, Positive Rights in Constitutional Law: No Need to Graft, Best Not to Prune, 3 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 750, 763 (2001).  
 86. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (A municipality is not immune 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional violations based on a defense of good faith actions 
by its law enforcement officers.). 
 87. Brown, supra note 38, at 1516. 
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rights-based arguments against state and local public health 
measures. She concludes that individual due process, equal protec-
tion, and other rights must give way to structurally-based police 
and parens patriae powers.88 Only later did affirmative interpreta-
tions of individual rights override core public health efforts to ad-
dress specific or general threats.89 On first glance, these develop-
ments simply illustrate how balancing public health and individual 
interests might favor either the community or individuals. The re-
ality is, however, far more complex.90
At the core of modern conflicts over public health services is the 
extent to which structural- and rights-based violations are “mirror 
images”91 within a cohesive constitutional framework. In several in-
stances, structural- or rights-based principles may alternatively be 
argued to advance public health objectives. In this sense, structural 
impediments or rights infringements may be equally viable options 
to challenge government laws and policies that inadequately pro-
mote the public’s health under three primary applications (see Fig-
ure 3): intervening rights, structural swords, and constitutional in-
ferences. As explained below, the first two applications provide 
clear opportunities for positive interventions but carry some risks 
related to adverse outcomes. The latter application, constitutional 
inferences, takes principles of constitutional cohesion beyond mere 
practice and back to its roots in legal theory. 
                                                   
 88. Wendy E. Parmet et al., Individual Rights Versus the Public’s Health—100 Years After 
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 652 (2005) (stating that vaccination laws, iso-
lation, or quarantines imposed for communicable diseases and laws about reporting sexually 
transmitted diseases rely on the state police power affirmed in Jacobson).
 89. Id.
 90. Professor Lawrence Gene Sager suggests that limitations of Supreme Court rights-
based jurisprudence are based in part on “institutional” constructs that curbed the Court’s 
willingness or capacity to intervene.  
[T]he important difference between a true constitutional conception and the ju-
dicially formulated construct is that the judicial construct may be truncated for 
reasons which are based not upon analysis of the constitutional concept but upon 
various concerns of the Court about its institutional role. These concerns operate 
to produce some judicial constructs which are not at all exhaustive of the consti-
tutional concepts they reflect. Thus, a federal judicial construct may not be a true 
constitutional conception because it may not exhaust the concept from which it 
derives . . . .  
Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 
HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1214–15 (1978). 
 91. Varol, supra note 33, at 1004 (“[C]onstitutional structure affects individual liberty, 
its mirror image has been left understudied. Scholars have largely assumed that individual 
rights have little resemblance to constitutional structure.”).  
190 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 53:1 
FIGURE 3. APPLICATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL COHESION
A. Intervening Rights 
Constitutional exercises of public health powers among all levels 
of government must conform to structural foundations like feder-
alism, separation of powers, sovereign powers, and preemption. 
Adherence to structural norms, however, is not the only measure 
to assess their constitutionality. When government uses structural 
principles to infringe unnecessarily on individual rights, cohesive 
arguments may follow. These arguments may be framed in the 
context of “intervening rights” to counter governmental exercises 
consistent with traditional structural norms. 
One of the premier illustrations of the role of rights-based ar-
guments to challenge core public health powers arose in Jacobson v. 
Massachusetts.92 In 1905, the Supreme Court issues its seminal deci-
sion upholding a state-based exercise of police powers authorizing 
Massachusetts’ localities to require adult vaccinations for smallpox. 
Reverend Henning Jacobson challenges state and local vaccination 
powers based largely on liberty norms via due process and equal 
protection violations (since elements of the vaccine law did not 
apply uniformly to adults and children). The Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts argues vehemently against Jacobson’s rights-based 
arguments under common public health powers. Yet, the Com-
monwealth also advances specific objections grounded in federal-
ism and separation of powers that were heavily relied upon in Jus-
tice Harlan’s majority opinion. 
In essence, Massachusetts asserts that deciding disputes over the 
scope of public health powers is the province of sovereign states, 
                                                   
 92. 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
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and not the federal Supreme Court. The premise resonates with 
the Court. “The safety and the health of the people of Massachu-
setts are, in the first instance, for that commonwealth to guard and 
protect. They are matters that do not ordinarily concern the na-
tional government.”93 The Commonwealth additionally purports 
that to the extent judicial courts must respect the legislative judg-
ments of state and local governments, the Supreme Court is not 
well-positioned to assess a locality’s implementation of, or basis for, 
a vaccination law. Again, the Court acquiesces: “[T]he court would 
usurp the functions of another branch of government if it ad-
judged, as matter of law, that the mode adopted under the sanc-
tion of the state, to protect the people at large was arbitrary, and 
not justified by the necessities of the case.”94 Essentially, Massachu-
setts requests the Court to step away from the case entirely based 
largely on structural foundations of federalism and separation of 
powers. The Court declines, choosing instead to fully assess Jacob-
son’s rights-based arguments but ultimately finding in favor of the 
Commonwealth.95
To the degree that Jacobson loses his appeal centered on indi-
vidual rights, the Court’s decision resounds the aforementioned, 
longstanding judicial acceptance of the overriding power of state 
and local public health efforts.96 However, Justice Harlan also clari-
fies how liberty principles do not succumb completely to public 
health police powers.97 In so doing, he examines the interrelated-
ness of structural foundations and individual rights to craft reason-
able and fair impositions on individual freedoms from vaccination 
requirements justified by the need to protect the public’s health.98
                                                   
 93. Id. at 38.
 94. Id. at 28. 
 95. Id. at 38 (“[W]e do not perceive that this legislation has invaded any right secured 
by the Federal Constitution.”). 
 96. See Parmet et al., supra note 88, at 329.  
 97. Justice Harlan explains: 
If there is any such power in the judiciary to review legislative action in respect of 
a matter affecting the general welfare, it can only be when that which the legisla-
ture has done comes within the rule that, if a statute purporting to have been en-
acted to protect the public health, the public morals, or the public safety, has no 
real or substantial relation to those objects, or is, beyond all question, a plain, 
palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the 
courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the Constitution. 
Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 31. 
 98. HODGE, JR., NUTSHELL, supra note 2, at 66, 85–95. Rights-based challenges to state 
and local public health powers proliferate in modern day. In 2016, a gestational surrogate of 
three babies challenged California public health officials (among others) in Cook v. Harding,
190 F. Supp. 3d 921 (C.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 879 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. 
Ct. 72 (2018). She alleged that a California statute protecting surrogacy contracts violated 
her due process and equal protection rights. Reticent to invade issues of state law due to 
federalism concerns, the court acknowledged the plaintiff’s constitutional assertions, but 
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Decades later in Morrison v. Olson (1988),99 the Court examines a 
provision of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978100 authorizing a 
judiciary panel to appoint independent counsel to investigate spe-
cific crimes among high-ranking executive officials. Separation of 
powers principles are clearly at play, but the Court focuses instead 
on due process interests.101 To the extent the statute guarantees the 
impartiality of decision-makers consistent with due process, it sur-
vives constitutional scrutiny. The next year the Court incorporates 
comparable analyses in Mistretta v. United States (1989),102 approving 
the structure of the U.S. Sentencing Commission. 
Similar cross-cutting analyses are reflected increasingly in con-
temporary judicial challenges and decisions.103 In 2017, a Florida-
based advocacy group claims that the state’s gun statutes preempt 
multiple ordinances passed by the City of Tallahassee.104 The City 
counters that state law and its accompanying penalties violate 
structural principles of legislative immunity as well as freedoms of 
speech.105 That same year in State ex rel. Brnovich v. City of Tucson,106
joint arguments grounded in local home rule authority and munic-
ipal due process107 are presented in response to the Arizona State 
legislature’s preemptive scheme to withhold all state funds from 
localities whose public health (or other) laws conflict with state 
                                                   
ultimately deferred to ongoing state court proceedings. Id. In Baddock v. Baltimore Cty., 239 
Md. App. 467 (2018), a hookah lounge operator challenged a county ordinance restricting 
its hours of operation on grounds of equal protection and due process violations. The court 
upheld the statute under a minimal rational basis review consistent with the public’s health. 
Id.
 99. 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (holding that a federal act vesting the judiciary with the power 
to appoint an inferior executive officer and prohibiting the Attorney General from remov-
ing the officer without good cause did not violate separation of powers principles).  
 100. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1988). 
 101. LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 125–26 (2000). 
 102. 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (holding that sentencing guidelines were constitutional, 
amounting to neither excessive delegation of legislative power nor violation of separation of 
powers principles). 
 103. Professor David Orentlicher addresses the overlap of structural power and interven-
ing rights in the context of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulation of the 
marketing of off-label drugs. David Orentlicher, Off-Label Drug Marketing, the First Amendment, 
and Federalism, 50 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 89 (2016). By regulating off-label marketing, FDA 
avoids federalism concerns arising from regulating the actual off-label use itself. Id. First 
Amendment arguments centered on how the regulation of promotional speech is preferable 
to “the federal government’s intrusion into the regulatory space of the states” is raised but 
rejected. Id. at 102.
 104. Florida Carry, Inc. v. City of Tallahassee, 212 So. 3d 452 (Fla. 2017).  
 105. Id. at 456 (“Appellees asserted that the penalty provisions provided in § 790.33 vio-
lated legislative immunity and the right of free expression.”). The case was dropped later 
only because the ordinances were never actually enforced. 
 106. 242 Ariz. 588 (2017). 
 107. Josh Bendor, Municipal Constitutional Rights: A New Approach, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 389 (2012) (explaining that municipalities have constitutional rights, such as the right 
to just compensation under the Fifth Amendment takings clause when the federal govern-
ment takes property).  
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laws. Though ultimately rejected by the Arizona Supreme Court,108
Tucson’s rights-based challenge (e.g., due process) to structurally-
based strategies (e.g., preemption) illuminates the state’s suspect 
legal tactics. Intervening rights arguments do not always succeed 
but they represent a potent avenue for addressing potential vices. 
B. Structural Swords 
The flipside of intervening rights arguments is the use of struc-
tural arguments as a sword to limit unwarranted infringements of 
individual rights contrary to the public’s health. Among other 
claims, government impositions on individual rights may be cir-
cumvented via arguments that: (1) the wrong level of government 
is acting (i.e., federalism);109 (2) the wrong division of government 
is acting (e.g., separation of powers);110 (3) a lower government’s 
effort is negated (i.e., preemption);111 (4) a government agency 
lacks authority to implement the measure (e.g., non- delegation 
doctrine, a subcomponent of separation of powers);112 or (5) insuf-
ficient evidence supports a proposed outcome under standards of 
judicial review.113
Judicial use of structural swords has its greatest application when 
damaging public health policies are reversed or abandoned. In 
2017, President Trump issued Executive Order 13768114 threaten-
                                                   
 108. Brnovich, 242 Ariz. at 600 (holding that regulation of unclaimed firearms is within 
the state’s “broad police powers,” which are not inherent in its municipalities). 
 109. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (finding under principles of federal-
ism that Congress exceeded its commerce powers by statutorily making gun possession with-
in a local school zone a federal criminal offense). 
 110. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 654 (1988). 
 111. See, e.g., Cippollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (preserving state-
based failure to warn claims against cigarette manufacturing companies on grounds that 
federal statutory law did not preempt state-based tort law claims. Preserving these claims 
provided opportunities for consumer retribution and incentivized tobacco manufacturers to 
companies to promote the public’s health). 
112. See, e.g., Boreali v. Axelrod, 71 N.Y.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1987) (invalidating New York 
State’s Public Health Council tobacco regulations as outside the Council’s delegated author-
ity from the legislature); see also N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. 
N.Y. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 653584/12 (N.Y. App. Div. July 30, 2013) (strik-
ing down New York City’s proposed ban on large portion sizes of sugar sweetened beverag-
es). 
 113. In Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 46–48 
(1983), the Court held that withdrawal of a passive restraint requirement in automobiles was 
arbitrary and capricious, due in large part to a lack of evidence that costs of passive restraints 
outweigh their safety benefits. Id. at 38. Consistent with principles of judicial review, an 
agency “must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its ac-
tion” before withdrawing its standards. Id. at 43.
 114. Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (2017). 
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ing to federally-defund “sanctuary cities.”115 It is a classic example of 
governmental overreaching leading to instant judicial challenges 
grounded in individual rights.116 In City of Chicago v. Sessions,117 how-
ever, a federal district court in Illinois rejects the Order as violative 
of separation of powers principles.118 Congress had not authorized 
the setting of special conditions for the receipt of all federal grants 
as relied upon by the federal executive in invoking the Order.119
Use of structural swords, however, can be double-edged akin to 
protection and promotion of the public’s health.120 As part of its 
“new federalism” jurisprudence in the 1990s,121 the Supreme Court 
issued a series of decisions including structural arguments derail-
ing legitimate public health or environmental objectives of Con-
gress. In Gregory v. Ashcroft (1991),122 the Court weighs a mandatory 
retirement age law for Missouri state judges against alleged viola-
tions of principles of equal protection and the federal Age Discrim-
ination in Employment Act. In her majority opinion, however, Jus-
tice O’Connor looks alternatively to principles of federalism.123 She 
concludes “congressional interference with [Missouri’s age limits] 
would upset the usual constitutional balance of federal and state 
                                                   
 115. Suzannah Gonzales et al., U.S. Sides Against Trump in Fight Over Sanctuary Cities,
CHI. TRIBUNE (Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-
sanctuary/u-s-judge-sides-against-trump-in-fight-over-sanctuary-cities-idUSKCN1BQ2VL.  
 116. See, e.g., City of Santa Clara v. Trump, No. 17-CV-00574-WHO, 2017 WL 1459081, at 
*24 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2017) (Santa Clara and San Francisco were granted an injunction on 
a finding that the Order was “unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment’s Due Process Clause”).  
 117. No. 17 C 5720, 2017 WL 4081821, *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 2017), aff’d, 888 F.3d 272 
(7th Cir. 2018). 
 118. Id. at 280–90 (“[The district court] concluded that . . . the Attorney General lacks 
the authority to impose [certain] Notice and Access conditions and that Chicago would suf-
fer irreparable harm without an injunction” against the conditions.). 
 119. Id. at 943. In addition, the Court found that the Attorney General lacked the statu-
tory authority to impose compliance conditions. 
 120. Public health is not the only legal area in which this observation is relevant. Profes-
sor Sager examines how the Supreme Court’s analyses of equal protection rights related to 
state-based school financing laws in San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 
(1973), were dictated in part by the Court’s concerns over “institutional” limits. These nota-
bly included the Court’s recognition that (1) assessing school finance and management 
provisions “raise[es] very complicated and controversial questions, and an inexperienced 
and inexpert Supreme Court ought not to impose [restraints] which curtail state experi-
mentation” in violation of separation of powers and (2) “substantial federalism concerns are 
threatened by the prospect of upsetting” state-based school finance provisions. See Sager, 
supra note 90, at 1218.  
 121. See generally James G. Hodge, Jr., The Role of New Federalism and Public Health Law, 12 
J.L. & HEALTH 309 (1998). 
 122. 501 U.S. 452, 453 (1991).  
 123. Id. at 457–58. 
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powers.”124 Despite individual rights concerns, mandatory retire-
ment ages for state judges is purely a matter of state concern.125
In New York v. United States (1992),126 Justice O’Connor, again 
writing for the majority, invalidates “take title” provisions127 of the 
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985.128 To 
the extent states are presented with an option of taking ownership 
of nuclear waste or held liable for its disposal, Congress unconsti-
tutionally attempted to “commandeer the legislative processes of 
the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a fed-
eral regulatory program.”129 Consistent with a cohesive view of 
principles of federalism, she notes: “[T]he Constitution divides au-
thority between federal and state governments, . . . for the protec-
tion of individuals.”130
In United States v. Lopez (1995),131 a minor faced criminal charges 
for possessing a gun at school in violation of the federal Gun Free 
School Zones Act (GFSZA).132 His attorneys look beyond rights-
based arguments to craft a successful federalism challenge to Con-
gress’ commerce authority133 to implement the Act itself. Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist agrees that Congress lacks commerce powers to pe-
nalize the mere possession, absent more, of a gun on or near 
school grounds. “To uphold the Government’s contentions,” as-
serts the Court, “we would have to . . . convert congressional au-
                                                   
 124. Id. at 460. Justice O’Connor noted that States’ authority to determine the qualifica-
tions of important government officials is at the heart of a representative government and 
protected under the Tenth Amendment. Id. at 463. 
 125. Id.
 126. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 127. The “take title” provisions of the Act required that any state that fails to provide for 
disposal of low-level nuclear waste generated within its borders by January 1, 1996, must ei-
ther take title to, or possession of, the waste, or else be liable for all damages incurred by an 
in-state generator or owner of such waste. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (1992). 
 128. Id.
 129. New York, 505 U.S. at 202. As Justice O’Connor elucidates further:  
States are not mere political subdivisions of the United States. State governments 
are neither regional offices nor administrative agencies of the Federal Govern-
ment. The positions occupied by state officials appear nowhere on the Federal 
Government’s most detailed organizational chart. The Constitution instead 
“leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty.” 
citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 245 (C. Rossiter ed., 1961), reserved explicitly to the States 
by the Tenth Amendment. Id. at 188. 
 130. New York, 505 U.S. at 181. As Robert Schapiro concludes, “[F]ederalism protects 
citizens, not states.” ROBERT SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION 
OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 76 (2009).  
 131. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 132. Gun-Free School Zones Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1990) [hereinafter GFSZA]. 
 133. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“[Congress shall have] power to regulate Commerce 
with foreign Nations, and among the several States and with the Indian Tribes.”).  
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thority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of 
the sort retained by the States.”134
As a result of Supreme Court decisions in cases like Gregory, New 
York, and Lopez,135 portions of federal acts designed to promote 
public health and safety nationally are repudiated solely on struc-
tural grounds. Similar decisions abound among lower courts. In 
ACORN v. Edwards (1996),136 for example, the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals invalidates a provision of the federal Lead Contamination 
Control Act of 1988,137 requiring states to create remedial programs 
to limit lead in drinking fountains.138 Congress’ attempt to imple-
ment the program is an “unconstitutional intrusion upon the 
States’ sovereign prerogative to legislate as it sees fit.”139
In November 2018, a federal district court in Michigan ruled 
that Congress lacked commerce authority to criminalize interstate 
cases of female genital mutilation (FGM). In United States v. Na-
garwala,140 the court sees a disconnect between specific commercial 
activity and the local practice of FGM under themes previously laid 
out in Morrison.141 “[F]ederalism concerns,” suggests the court, 
                                                   
 134. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567–68. 
 135. After the Court’s decision in Lopez, Congress amended GFSZA to require that af-
fected firearms must have “moved in or otherwise affect interstate or foreign commerce.” 
GFSZA § 922(q)(2)(A) (1990). GFSZA declares, 
Congress has the power, under the interstate commerce clause . . . to ensure the 
safety of the nation’s schools by reasoning that crime involving firearms is a na-
tionwide problem, firearms and ammunition move easily in interstate commerce, 
and violent crime in school zones results in a decline in the quality of education 
which adversely impacts interstate commerce. 
Id. at § 922(q)(1)(A)-(I). Correspondingly, most courts have upheld convictions under 
GFSZA. See, e.g., United States v. Weekes, 224 F. App’x 200 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. 
Smith, (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Dorsey, 418 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2005); United States 
v. Nieves-Castano, 480 F.3d 597 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Cruz-Rodriguez, 541 F.3d 19 
(1st Cir. 2008). But see United States v. Tait, 202 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. 
Haywood, 657 Fed. Appx. 97 (3rd Cir. 2016); United States v. Guzman-Montanez, 756 F.3d 1 
(1st Cir. 2014). 
 136. 81 F.3d 1387 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 137. H.R. REP. No. 1041, at 6–8 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3793, 3793–95. 
 138. Section 300j-24(d) of the Lead Contamination Control Act “requires each State to 
‘establish a program, consistent with this section,’ to assist local educational agencies, 
schools, and day care centers in remedying potential lead contamination in their drinking 
water systems.” ACORN, 81 F.3d at 1394. 
 139. ACORN, 81 F.3d at 1394. 
 140. 350 F. Supp. 3d 613 (E.D. Mich. 2018). 
 141. See e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610–13 (2000) (The Supreme 
Court delineated four factors to assess the viability of congressional acts under the com-
merce power: (1) the economic nature of the activity; (2) a jurisdictional element limiting 
the reach of the law to a discrete set of activities with explicit connections with, or effect on, 
interstate commerce; (3) express congressional findings regarding the regulated activity’s 
effects on interstate commerce; and (4) the link between the regulated activity and inter-
state commerce.). In Nagarwala, 350 F. Supp 3d, the court held that FGM was not a com-
mercial activity because of a lack of an interstate market and that it was essentially a violent 
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“deprive Congress of the power to enact [the statute prohibiting 
FGM]”142 given an absence of proof of substantial effects on inter-
state commerce.143 In December 2018, federal district court Judge 
Reed O’Connor invalidated the ACA144 in Texas v. United States.145
When Congress zeroed out the penalty assessed on eligible persons 
who did not acquire health insurance via the individual mandate 
in 2017,146 the court concludes that the entire ACA is voided under 
an obtuse interpretation of principles of severability embedded 
within separation of powers. 
In each of these cases, results inapposite to Congress’ laudable 
public health objectives reflect the risks of advancing structural ar-
guments. Structural principles may help stabilize government lev-
els and branches, but not always lead to favorable public health 
outcomes. 
C. Constitutional Inferences 
The prior two applications of constitutional cohesion reflect fairly-
settled, albeit often under-utilized, principles of constitutional law. 
Despite risks inherent in the utilization of these themes, the merits 
of applied arguments grounded in intervening rights and structur-
al swords are indubitable. Intervening rights principles illuminate 
unconstitutional elements of government acts that may otherwise 
be adjudged as lawful. Structural swords may derail governmental 
interventions that may not fully rise to the level of rights infringe-
ments, but still reflect unconstitutional vices. 
There are, however, additional opportunities to interject consti-
tutional norms challenging existing laws or policies. A court may 
identify that a specific act (or omission) negatively impacts the 
public’s health, but fail to conclude that it impinges one’s rights 
                                                   
crime, which the Supreme Court has previously held to not be economic activity. See United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995). 
 142. Nagarwala, 350 F. Supp. 3d at 618. 
 143. The court determined there were no significant congressional findings or other 
evidence of a substantial effect on interstate commerce despite Congress’ findings that the 
practice of FGM (1) is carried out by members of certain cultural and religious groups; (2) 
often results in physical and psychological health effects among affected women; (3) in-
fringes on specific rights; (4) can be difficult for any single State or local jurisdiction to pro-
hibit; and (5) can be prohibited without violating persons’ religious freedoms under the 
First Amendment. Nagarwala, 350 F. Supp. 3d at 629 n.8. 
 144. 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2010). 
 145. No. 4:18-CV-00167-O (N. D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2018). 
 146. Sarah Somers & Jane Perkins, Texas Court Decision on the Affordable Care Act: The Rul-
ing and What to Expect, NAT’L HEALTH LAW PROGRAM (Dec. 17, 2018) https://healthlaw.org/
texas-court-decision-on-the-affordable-care-act-the-ruling-and-what-to-expect/; see also James 
G. Hodge, Judicial Invalidation of the Affordable Care Act, JURIST (Dec. 19, 2018), 
https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2018/12/james-hodge-judge-invalid-aca/.  
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under a prevailing balance test or other interpretation.147 Such an 
outcome could easily be attributed to a consequence of constitu-
tional balancing: sometimes an offending law or policy does not 
sufficiently implicate structural or rights-based infringements. 
However, it also may extend from a failure to properly recast a 
constitutional issue in terms of an identifiable vice. The principle 
of constitutional inferences suggests that vices may be inferred 
from governmental violations. 
Constitutional vices may arise even when clear breaches of spe-
cific, enumerated rights or aberrations of structural norms do not. 
During the 1920s, the Supreme Court justified incorporating key 
Bill of Rights principles to the states via the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in part to counter known vices. In De Jonge v. State of Oregon
(1937), Chief Justice Hughes elucidates: “[E]xplicit mention [of 
rights to assemble in the First Amendment] does not argue [for 
its] exclusion elsewhere. For the right is one that cannot be denied 
without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all civil and political institutions” (emphasis 
added).148 Years later, in 1945, concurring Justice Jackson acknowl-
edges inherent vices at stake in Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indi-
ans v. United States,149 denying Native Americans’ property rights to 
reservation lands.150
In 2015, the Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right to 
same-sex marriage under substantive due process in Obergefell v. 
Hodges.151 Justice Kennedy equates vice determinations within a 
framework of injustices: 
                                                   
 147. Many courts may be leery of arguments disguised as “vices” but actually grounded 
in ethical or normative judgments. Samuel Enoch Stumpf, The Moral Element in Supreme Court 
Decisions, 6 VAND. L. REV. 41, 41 (1952) (“[T]he past twenty years reveals a manful resistance 
on the part of [Supreme Court] judges to intrude their moral and ethical judgments into 
their decisions.”). In cases unrelated to constitutional questions, judicial efforts to correct 
injustices may be expressed through proclaimed public policy exceptions to long-settled 
doctrines. See generally G.N. Williams, Importance of Public Policy Considerations in Judicial Deci-
sion Making, 25 INT’L LEGAL PRAC. 134 (2000).  
 148. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937). See also Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 
46, 53 (1947). The Court failed to incorporate all of the first eight constitutional amend-
ments to the states, Justice Black’s dissent relied extensively on statements from Rep. John 
Bingham, a primary framer of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. He justified the 
amendment to thwart the “[m]any instances of State injustice and oppression [that had] 
already occurred in the State legislation of this Union.” Id. at 107. 
149. Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335, 355 (1945) 
(“The generation of Indians who suffered the privations, indignities, and brutalities of the 
westward march of the whites have gone to the Happy Hunting Ground, and nothing that 
we can do can square the account with them.”). 
150. Id. (“[J]udgment or no judgment—a moral obligation of a high order rests upon 
this country to provide for decent shelter, clothing, education, and industrial advancement 
of [Native Americans] . . . The Indian problem is essentially a sociological problem, not a 
legal one.”).  
 151. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2589 (2015). 
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The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our 
own times. The generations that wrote and ratified the Bill 
of Rights . . . did not presume to know the extent of free-
dom in all its dimensions . . . . When new insight reveals dis-
cord between the Constitution’s central protections and a received 
legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed (emphasis 
added).152
Generating new rights, in essence, begins with identification of “in-
justices” (or governmental vices) through new “insights.” It is the 
Court’s unique role, in fact, its constitutional duty,153 to consistently 
look for and clarify these vices154 even when the underlying issues 
are politically dynamic.155 Still, ascertaining the scope and nature of 
constitutional vices is complicated and controversial. Reasonable 
minds differ on what actually constitutes a vice. Some may, for ex-
ample, denote the allowance of rampant acts of gun violence na-
tionally as a form of government oppression. Others insist that the 
Second Amendment right to bear arms (which supports popula-
tions’ liberal access to guns) exists to deter government oppres-
sion.156 Somewhere between these views lies an appropriate legal 
balance that respects Second Amendment rights and enhances 
communal health pursuant to principles of constitutional cohesion.
Despite the complexities of ascertaining vices, whenever a con-
stitutional vice can be tied to government action or inaction, con-
comitant remedies assuredly exist to address it. The notion that the 
Constitution provides fixed provisions of unbending nature may be 
the mantra of originalists, but it hardly befits the role of the judici-
ary, particularly the Supreme Court, to assess vices and ascribe pro-
tections. As Professor Cass Sunstein notes, “[c]onstitutional change 
is often a product not of constitutional amendment, but of inter-
pretation, leading to new understandings of old provisions.”157 As 
Justice Kennedy concludes in Obergefell, the Constitution is suffi-
                                                   
 152. Id. at 2598. 
 153. See id. (“The identification and protection of fundamental rights [are] an enduring 
part of the judicial duty to interpret the Constitution . . . [that] has not been reduced to any 
formula.”). 
 154. As the Supreme Court denotes in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803), it is 
“emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” 
 155. See generally Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1263 (D. Or. 2016); see 
infra discussion Part IV A. 
 156. Mosby v. Devine, 851 A.2d 1031, 1052 (R.I. 2004) (Flanders, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that an armed populace was needed to “provide a republican counterweight to the omni-
present threat that government rulers exercising arbitrary power would usurp the people’s 
rights and liberties”). 
 157. Cass R. Sunstein, Why Does the American Constitution Lack Social and Economic Guaran-
tees, 56 SYR. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (citing David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 
63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996)). 
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ciently flexible, to permit “future generations [to] protect . . . the 
right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning.”158
III. AUXILIARY, CREATIVE, AND GHOST RIGHTING
At the crux of principles of constitutional cohesion is the premise 
that constitutional remedies exist to counter known or identified 
vices, specifically among governmental actors. These remedies may 
be found within structural foundations or explicit enumerated 
rights. Yet sometimes, as per the notion of constitutional infer-
ences, the cure for a known vice may not be explicitly framed in 
rights-based protections or structural principles. In such cases, it 
may be easy to conclude there is no constitutional remedy for an 
identified vice. This is simply untrue. 
Constitutional interpretations in response to governmental ac-
tions or inactions implicating vices take many forms, most notably 
framed in rights-based parlance. Long-standing Supreme Court ju-
risprudence reveals that not every right has to be specified consti-
tutionally to warrant protection.159 Unstated rights may flow from 
new interpretations of express language in the Bill of Rights as well 
as the structure of the Constitution itself.160 Some legal scholars as-
sert that the Ninth Amendment161 supports unenumerated rights162
by clarifying how the limited provisions in the Bill of Rights did not 
foreclose the existence of other rights.163 Professor Akhil Reed Am-
ar posits that the judiciary is poised via the Ninth Amendment to 
                                                   
 158. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015). 
 159. Sunstein, supra note 157, at 11. 
 160. See Randy E. Barnett, Unenumerated Constitutional Rights and the Rule of Law, 14 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 615, 628 (1991) (James Wilson has proclaimed that “[i]n all societies, 
there are many powers and rights, which cannot be particularly enumerated.”). 
 161. U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, 
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”). 
 162. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 1, 1, 3 (2006) (classifying multiple models for interpreting the purposes of the Ninth 
Amendment and concluding that one, the individual natural rights model, “preserve[s] un-
enumerated individual rights”); see also Kurt Lash, The Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth 
Amendment, 83 TEX. L. REV. 331, 347, 362 (2004) (suggesting Barnett’s individual natural 
rights interpretation could protect a “collective right of the people to state or local self-
government” under principles of federalism). 
 163. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 439 (1789). Concerning the proposition of the Bill 
of Rights, Framer James Madison stated:  
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by enumerating particular 
exceptions to the grant of power, it would disparage those rights which were not 
placed in that enumeration; and it might follow by implication, that those rights 
which were not singled out, were intended to be assigned into the hands of the 
General Government, and were consequently insecure. This is one of the most 
plausible arguments I have ever heard against the admission of a bill of rights into 
this system; but, I conceive, that it may be guarded against. 
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consider unexpressed individual rights “that nevertheless might 
deserve constitutional status.”164
Under these and other perspectives examined below, new rights 
may emerge (1) from cobbled interpretations of a penumbra of 
rights (“auxiliary righting”); (2) expanded conceptions of existing 
rights (“creative righting”); or (3) ethereal rights generated from 
principles embedded within structural foundations or unstated 
constitutional norms (“ghost righting”). 
A. Auxiliary Righting 
Constitutional textualists tend to look solely at the express lan-
guage of the Constitution to ascertain whether rights exist.165 How-
ever, Supreme Court jurisprudence is not limited to the actual, 
specific text or originalist notions of the Framers’ intended mean-
ing.166 To the extent the Constitution is a living document capable 
of modern application, the Court has consistently demonstrated a 
willingness to view its protections beyond antiquated notions.167
A clear example of constitutional flexibility relates to the Court’s 
expansive view of rights of privacy. Modern privacy rights evolved 
from initial conceptions dating back to the late nineteenth centu-
ry,168 but it was not until the mid-1960s that the Supreme Court ex-
plicitly acknowledged a standalone “right to privacy.” In Griswold v. 
Connecticut (1965),169 the Court strikes down a state law prohibiting 
birth control. As Justice Douglas explains for the majority, privacy 
rights are not explicitly framed in the Constitution. Rather, they 
are undergirded via the First, Third, Fourth, Ninth, and Four-
teenth Amendments. Collectively, these provisions provide “pe-
numbras” from which “zones of privacy” originate.170 In this way, 
the Court examines the Constitution as a cohesive whole instead of 
a mere assemblage of principles to craft auxiliary privacy rights that 
were otherwise unstated textually. Modern privacy rights buttress 
                                                   
 164. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 328 (2005). Professor 
Amar prompts judges to “look for rights that the people themselves have truly embraced—
in the great mass of state constitutions, perhaps, or in widely celebrated lived traditions, or 
in broadly inclusive political reform movements.” Id. at 329. 
 165. See Victoria Nourse, Two Kinds of Plain Meaning, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 997, 1003 
(2011).
 166. See Michael A. Livermore & Theodore D. Rave, Conversation, Representation, and Allo-
cation: Justice Breyer’s Active Liberty, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1505, 1508 (2006).  
 167. Terrance Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1054 (1981). 
 168. See S. D. Warren & L. D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).  
 169. 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).  
 170. Id. at 484. 
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reproductive and other freedoms171 with significant corollary public 
health benefits. 
One of Americans’ cherished freedoms is their claim of a right 
to citizenship pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.172 The 
amendment’s text, however, does not speak to one’s right to re-
main a citizen. In 1958, the Court holds that federal authority to 
revoke citizenship resides in Congress’ implied power to regulate 
foreign affairs.173 In Afroyim v. Rusk (1967),174 it reverses course. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Black finds that the Constitution 
“grants Congress no express power to strip people of their citizen-
ship.”175 Citizenry is so fundamental to societal structure that the 
Fourteenth Amendment must be interpreted to protect one’s right 
to be free from involuntary expatriation.176 This auxiliary right aris-
ing in Afroyim cannot be “shifted, canceled, or diluted at the will of 
the Federal Government, the States, or any other governmental 
unit.”177
In a remarkable modern case, Juliana v. United States (2016),178
climate activists sue multiple federal entities during President 
Obama’s administration in a federal district court in Oregon.179
They raise several claims, including substantive due process viola-
tions regarding federal failures to address climate change.180 Feder-
                                                   
 171. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).  
 172. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state 
wherein they reside.”). 
 173. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 62 (1958) (affirming Congress’ right to revoke the 
petitioner’s citizenship after he voted in a foreign election). 
 174. 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967) (striking down a federal statute enabling revocation of 
citizenship based on a person’s actions to vote in another country’s legislative body). 
 175. Id. at 257, 258–62 (discussing the legislative history of expatriation, including a 
proposed bill to require the consent of the federal government before an individual can 
voluntarily renounce his or her citizenship). 
 176. Id. at 268. 
 177. Id. at 262. 
 178. 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1233 (D. Or. 2016). In 2018, the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals denied the U.S. petition for a writ of mandamus. After multiple procedural maneu-
vers, including two Supreme Court orders, the case is currently stayed pending a decision by 
the Ninth Circuit. 
 179. See, e.g., Steve Kroft, The Climate Change Lawsuit that Could Stop the U.S. Government 
from Supporting Fossil Fuels, CBS NEWS (Mar. 3, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/
juliana-versus-united-states-the-climate-change-lawsuit-that-could-stop-the-u-s-government-
from-supporting-fossil-fuels-60-minutes/. 
 180. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1233. The constitutionally-framed arguments raised by 
the plaintiffs make more sense in part due to the 2011 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court 
in American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011), denying state-based claims 
for damages related to greenhouse gas emissions as violations of federal public nuisance law. 
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, determined that Congress’ passage of multiple 
federal laws empowering the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate green-
house gases effectively circumvented any nuisance claim even if the EPA failed to properly 
or fully regulate. Id. at 420–29. 
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al defendants challenge plaintiffs’ standing181 and question the 
court’s capacity to adjudicate non-justiciable political questions 
under principles of separations of powers.182 Recognizing the case 
is no “ordinary lawsuit,”183 Judge Aiken disagrees with the federal 
defendants, systematically striking down their structural argu-
ments.184 She then sweeps aside the government’s contention that 
it need only demonstrate a minimal rationale for its efforts con-
cerning climate change under substantive due process. 
In so doing, Judge Aiken paves the way for a unique and aggres-
sive interpretation of plaintiffs’ liberty interests. Citing Supreme 
Court precedents, the court clarifies that fundamental liberty in-
terests include enumerated rights as well as rights (1) “deeply 
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” or (2) “fundamental 
to our scheme of ordered liberty[.]”185 While the Supreme Court is 
leery of expansive interpretations of liberty interests,186 recognition 
of new fundamental rights is not “out of bounds.”187 “[I] have no 
doubt,” concludes Judge Aiken, “that the right to a climate system ca-
pable of sustaining human life is fundamental to a free and ordered socie-
ty.”188 Consistent with Supreme Court reasoning in Obergefell v. 
                                                   
 181. The defendants’ claim that the U.S. could not be sued for failure to act was rejected 
by the court. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (finding that the Commonwealth 
had standing to challenge the EPA’s refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions). When 
the federal government exercises its powers, states may sue to compel it to act in accordance 
with that power where state’s public health, environmental, or other interests are at risk. Id.
 182. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1235.  
 183. Id. at 1234. (“[T]his lawsuit is not about proving that climate change is happening 
or that human activity is driving it . . . those facts are undisputed. The questions before the 
Court are whether defendants are responsible for some of the harm caused by climate 
change, whether plaintiffs may challenge defendants’ climate change policy in court, and 
whether this Court can direct defendants to change their policy without running afoul of 
the separation of powers doctrine.”).  
 184. Id. at 1251. As the court explicates, separation of powers principles may limit its ju-
risdiction outside actual cases or controversies; “federal courts retain broad authority ‘to 
fashion practical remedies when confronted with complex and intractable constitutional 
violations.’” Id. at 1242–43 (citing Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 526 (2011)). 
 185. Id. at 1249 (citing McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010)) (internal 
citations, quotations, and emphasis omitted). 
 186. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (citation and quotation marks 
omitted). 
 187. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1249 (emphasis added). Assessing whether a right is fun-
damental requires courts to engage in “reasoned judgment,” keeping in mind that 
“[h]istory and tradition guide and discipline this inquiry but do not set its outer bounda-
ries.” See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015). 
 188. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1250 (emphasis added). Judge Aiken compares her craft-
ing of this specific right akin to the Supreme Court’s elucidation of a right to same-sex mar-
riage from substantive due process principles in Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584. “Just as marriage 
is the ‘foundation of the family,’ a stable climate system is quite literally the foundation ‘of 
society, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress.’” Juliana, 217 F. 
Supp. 3d at 1250–51 (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888)); cf. Minors Oposa 
v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Envt’l & Nat. Res., G.R. No. 101083, 33 I.L.M. 173, 187–88 (S.C., July 
30, 1993) (Phil.) (stating that without “a balanced and healthful ecology,” future genera-
tions “stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life”). 
204 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 53:1 
Hodges,189 she views a stable climate system as essential to exercising 
other rights to life, liberty, and property.190 Failing to assure it, 
whether via direct action or omission, infringes plaintiffs’ funda-
mental rights under substantive due process.191
The bold illustration of auxiliary righting in Juliana is potentially 
short-lived. The federal government has appealed the decision 
multiple times to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Su-
preme Court. Both courts have allowed the trial court to proceed 
while signaling incongruities with its determinations. Regardless of 
its fate, the decision provides key insights for other activist courts 
seeking to identify constitutional vices with supporting rights to 
address them.192
B. Creative Righting 
Through auxiliary righting, courts look beyond unstated princi-
ples to craft individual rights via enhanced interpretations emanat-
ing from constitutional foundations. In other cases, courts rely on 
creative assessments of explicit rights-based language. In either in-
stance, the result is the same: new rights conceptions are born 
from jurists wielding constitutional principles toward a specific 
end.
“Creative righting” can behoove the public’s health. For exam-
ple, the Supreme Court has increasingly culled from the prohibi-
tive language of the Eighth Amendment an affirmative obligation 
to protect prisoners’ health. In Helling v. McKinney (1993),193 it 
                                                   
 189. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599.
 190. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1250. 
 191. Id. at 1251 (citing Penilla v. City of Huntington Park, 115 F.3d 707, 709 (9th Cir. 
1997) (keeping its analyses within what has been labeled the “danger creation” exception to 
the Supreme Court’s determination in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Ser-
vices, 489 U.S. 189 (1989), that government generally is not required to act for one’s benefit 
under the liberty principle, and pursuant to this exception, government may plausibly be 
required to act when it “places a person in peril in deliberate indifference to their safety”). 
In Juliana, the alleged peril is the government’s failure to limit third-party CO2 emissions 
contributing to climate change and negative health and environmental effects. For the 
claim to prevail, plaintiffs would have to demonstrate at trial that “(1) the government’s acts 
created the danger to the plaintiff; (2) the government knew its acts caused that danger; 
and (3) the government with deliberate indifference failed to act to prevent the alleged 
harm.” Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1252.  
 192. See infra text accompanying note 322; see also Alfred T. Goodwin, A Wake-Up Call for 
Judges, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 785, 785–86, 788 (2015) (“The third branch can, and should, take 
another long and careful look at the barriers to litigation created by modern doctrines of 
subject-matter jurisdiction and deference to the legislative and administrative branches of 
government.”). 
 193. 509 U.S. 25, 25, 31 (1993) (addressing whether a viable Eighth Amendment claim 
exists “by alleging that his compelled exposure to [environmental tobacco smoke] poses an 
unreasonable risk to his health”). 
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rules that involuntary exposure to second-hand smoke can form 
the basis of an Eighth Amendment injunction. While such protec-
tions historically apply to more egregious government conduct 
(e.g., torture),194 Helling extends them to obviate mere risks of inju-
ry to prisoners.195 Using a similar analysis in Brown v. Plata (2011),196
the Court limits prison overcrowding in California on grounds of 
inadequate access to mental health care. “A prison that deprives 
prisoners of basic sustenance, including adequate medical care,” 
notes the Court, “is incompatible with the concept of human dig-
nity and has no place in civilized society.”197
In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health (1990),198 a 
fundamental right to refuse medical treatment is deduced from 
substantive due process via the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
guardians of a patient in a vegetative state fought to exercise her 
wish to terminate artificial hydration and nutrition.199 Under due 
process, the Court infers a “constitutionally protected liberty inter-
est in refusing unwanted medical treatment.”200 Justice Antonin 
Scalia, in concurrence, belies the Court’s apparent departure from 
the Constitution’s text and purpose.201
Unfortunately, public health promotion can also be lost in con-
stitutional translations. In 2008, the Supreme Court’s interpreta-
tion of the right to bear arms in District of Columbia v. Heller202 led to 
a substantial reassessment of the Second Amendment.203 Justice 
Scalia bifurcates the Amendment’s (1) prefatory clause (“A well 
regulated Militia, being necessary to the Security of a free State”) 
from the (2) operative clause (“the right of the people to keep and 
bear arms, shall not be infringed”). Dismissing the former clause as 
nonessential despite long-standing established precedent,204 Justice 
                                                   
 194. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (incorporating the Eighth Amend-
ment against the state of California and all other states as a result); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 
U.S. 130, 136 (1878) (“[I]t is safe to affirm that punishments of torture . . . and all others in 
the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by” the Eighth Amendment.). 
 195. Helling, 509 U.S. at 35. In dissent, Justice Clarence Thomas argued that the Court’s 
expansion of Eighth Amendment’s protections went “beyond all bounds of history and 
precedent.” Id. at 37 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 196. 563 U.S. 493, 510–11 (2011). 
 197. Id. at 511. 
 198. 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
 199. Id. at 278. 
 200. Id.
 201. “The text of the Due Process Clause does not protect individuals against depriva-
tions of liberty simpliciter. It protects them against deprivations of liberty ‘without due pro-
cess of law.’” Id. at 293 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 202. 554 U.S. 570, 573 (2008).  
 203. U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of 
a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.”). 
 204. Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65–66 (1980) (holding that a federal statute 
prohibiting a felon from owning a firearm “is consonant with the concept of equal protec-
tion embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment”); United States v. Miller, 
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Scalia argues that the operative language creates a right to self-
defense at home with a lawful firearm. In dissent, Justice Stevens 
alleges that the “Court appear[s] to have fashioned [its interpreta-
tion] out of whole cloth.”205
The Court’s re-envisioning of Second Amendment language re-
flects a modern example of creative righting that drew immediate 
criticism with lasting repercussions on public health and safety. 
Countless gun laws and policies survive public health challenges 
due, in part, to the Court’s aggressive assessment of individual 
rights to bear arms.206 Tens of thousands of Americans are injured 
or killed needlessly due to lax gun control measures.207 In 2018, re-
tired Justice Stevens called for a complete repeal of the Second 
Amendment given the horrendous escalation of gun-related deaths 
nationally.208 Early in 2019, the Court agreed via a slim 5-4 vote to 
hear oral arguments in New York State Rifle and Pistol Association v. 
City of New York in which gun rights proponents challenge a restric-
tive local handgun possession ordinance.209 Public health officials 
are already prognosticating the Court’s further expansion of Sec-
ond Amendment rights in its forthcoming decision.210
C. Ghost Righting 
As ready examples of constitutional inferences, auxiliary or crea-
tive righting involve interpretive judicial exercises based on exist-
ing Constitutional provisions. “Ghost righting,” however, is distinct. 
                                                   
307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (stating that the Court “cannot say that the Second Amendment 
guarantees the right to keep and bear” a “shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen 
inches in length”).  
 205. Heller, 554 U.S. at 646 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 206. See Jon S. Vernick & Stephen P. Teret, Firearms & Health: The Right to be Armed with 
Accurate Information About the Second Amendment, 83 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1773, 1773; Daniel W. 
Webster et al., Flawed Gun Policy Research Could Endanger Public Safety, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
918 (1997). 
 207. Guns in the US: The Statistics Behind the Violence, BBC NEWS (Jan. 5, 2016) 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-34996604; Michelle Samuels, Black American 
Life Expectancy Decreasing Disproportionately Due to Firearms, B.U. SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH
(Dec. 4, 2018) https://www.bu.edu/sph/2018/12/04/gun-deaths-have-taken-2-5-years-off-
us-life-expectancy/.  
 208. John Paul Stevens, Repeal the Second Amendment,” N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/27/opinion/john-paul-stevens-repeal-second-
amendment.html.  
 209. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 883 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2018) (hold-
ing that a gun licensing scheme limiting the transportation of a firearm from the licensed 
address only “to and from an authorized small arms range/shooting club, unloaded, in a 
locked container, the ammunition to be carried separately” did not violate the Second 
Amendment), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 939 (U.S. Jan. 22, 2019) (No. 18-280). 
 210. Adam Liptak, Justices Accept New York Case on Gun Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2019, at 
A1 (“It could be a landmark case with major implications for gun policy”) (quoting gun con-
trol advocate Adam Winkler).  
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It refers to the capacity of courts to recognize or create core prin-
ciples that neither the structure nor language of the Constitution 
explicitly convey or denote. Ghost righting seems mysterious, even 
shadowy. However, its foundations under advanced interpretations 
of constitutional norms are clearly seen related to expressed rights 
to education and travel. 
In 1971, a federal district court in Massachusetts recognizes a 
constitutional right to education without specifying any underlying 
authority.211 A year later, another federal district court in New 
Hampshire acknowledges a right to public school education de-
spite the absence of constitutional textual support.212 “[N]o author-
ity was needed,” held the court, “for the fundamental American 
principle that a public school education through high school is a 
basic right of all citizens.”213 In San Antonio Independent School District 
v. Rodriguez (1973),214 the Supreme Court states, in dicta, that there 
is no explicit or implicit constitutional right to education.215 Thir-
teen years later, however, in Papasan v. Allain (1986), the Court 
clarifies that whether a minimally adequate education is a funda-
mental right is “not yet definitively settled.”216 Consequently, lower 
court cases holding that education is a fundamental right remain 
valid. 
Modern scholars concur. Professor Susan Bitensky argues that 
Justice Powell, writing for the majority in Rodriguez, does not 
“adopt a rigid and absolutist position against the right [to educa-
tion].”217 Professor Derek Black argues for recognition of a collec-
                                                   
 211. Ordway v. Hargaves, 323 F. Supp. 1155, 1158 (D. Mass. 1971) (holding that a public 
school must reinstate a student given a failure by the school to demonstrate direct harms to 
the student or others). The court finds it is “beyond argument that the right to receive a 
public school education is a basic personal right or liberty.” Id.
 212. Cook v. Edwards, 341 F. Supp. 307, 310–11 (D.N.H.1972) (holding a student’s in-
definite expulsion from school implicated substantive due process because it could end the 
plaintiff’s scholastic career). The identified constitutional vice which the court was arguably 
attempting to address in its pronouncement relates most closely to oppression. In Cook,
plaintiff alleges the defendant school board acted in excess of school district regulations 
regarding appropriate grounds and process for expulsion. Id.
 213. Id. at 310–11.  
 214. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 215. Id. at 34–35 (“It is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional 
rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. . . . Education, of course, is 
not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do 
we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected.”). Based in part on guidance from 
the Supreme Court, other lower courts have since disagreed with the findings in Massachu-
setts and New Hampshire. See infra Part IV.C. 
 216. 478 U.S. 265, 285 (1986) (deciding whether a disparate public school funding 
scheme unconstitutionally deprived children of a minimally adequate education). In Rodri-
guez, differences in public school funding resulted from “allowing local control over local 
property tax funding of the public schools.” Id. at 266–67. In Papasan, such differences re-
sulted from state decisions to allocate resources. Id.  
 217. Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education Under the U.S. Consti-
tution: A Beginning to the End of the National Education Crisis, 86 NW. U.L. REV. 550, 567 (1992) 
208 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 53:1 
tive constitutional right to education on historical bases as a means 
to obviate state malfeasance.218 What prior courts adjudicated as a 
fundamental right to education absent any explicit textual sources 
exemplifies ghost righting. 
The technique resurfaces in the Court’s long-standing and mul-
ti-faceted recognition of rights to travel. Like privacy or education 
rights, nowhere in the language of the Constitution is there an ex-
plicit reference to rights to travel. Yet, in a series of cases, the 
Court specifically recognizes travel rights to address governmental 
infringements constituting malfeasance and other vices. In Aptheker 
v. Secretary of State (1964)219 the Court invalidates a federal law bar-
ring members of communist organizations from using a passport.220
It notes: 
Freedom of movement across frontiers in either direction, 
and inside frontiers as well, [is] a part of our heritage. 
Travel abroad, like travel within the country, . . . may be as 
close to the heart of the individual as the choice of what he 
eats, or wears, or reads. Freedom of movement is basic in 
our scheme of values.221
Two years later, in United States v. Guest (1966),222 the Supreme 
Court acknowledges that the “freedom to travel throughout the 
United States has long been recognized as a basic right under the 
Constitution,”223 despite any specific identified textual support.224
Instead, it relies on structural principles. State unification via the 
Constitution, surmises the Court in Guest, is not possible absent a 
right to travel.225
                                                   
(suggesting that the Court would only adjudge the existence of such a right if presented 
with a case of a government that completely denied children access to an education).  
 218. Although Professor Black acknowledges education rights are not expressly guaran-
teed via the Constitution, he asserts that states attending the Constitutional Convention 
were required to add an education mandate to their state constitutions. Education, he pos-
its, is fundamental to being a citizen and must not be infringed by state malfeasance. See
Derek W. Black, The Constitutional Compromise to Guarantee Education, 70 STAN. L. REV. 735, 
743, 745–46 (2018) (“[O]ne of the points of ensuring education as a basic right of citizen-
ship was to place it beyond manipulation. Failure to do so would jeopardize the republican 
form of government itself.”). Unlike prior decisions, he would tie a right to education as an 
auxiliary to Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of citizenship. Id. at 744. 
 219. 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
 220. See id. at 503–05 (holding unconstitutional § 6 of the Subversive Activities Control 
Act, making it a felony for a member of a Communist organization to apply for or use a 
passport).
 221. Id. at 505–06 (citation omitted). 
 222. 383 U.S. 745 (1966). 
 223. Id. at 758. 
 224. See id. at 759. The Court briefly considers whether a right to travel flows from the 
Commerce Clause, but ultimately rejects this exploration. 
 225. See id. at 757. 
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Two decades later, Justice Brennan denotes how the “elusive” 
right to travel is historically inferred from “the federal structure of 
government adopted by our Constitution.”226 Even as the Court lat-
er connects some aspects of the right to travel to specific constitu-
tional provisions, it reaffirms that at least one element of the right 
exists despite any textual support. In Saenz v. Roe (1999), it exam-
ines three components of the right to travel, only two of which 
have textual sources.227 First, U.S. citizens have a right “to be treat-
ed as a welcome visitor . . . when temporarily present” in another 
state under Article IV’s privileges and immunities clause. Second, 
they have a right to be treated like other citizens who are perma-
nent state residents pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment’s priv-
ileges and immunities clause. 
In Saenz, the Court also finds that citizens have rights to ingress 
and egress across state borders. As in prior decisions, however, it 
cannot specify a constitutional source for this component.228 Bor-
rowing language from earlier jurisprudence, the Court concludes 
that such rights “may simply have been ‘conceived from the begin-
ning to be a necessary concomitant of the stronger Union the Con-
stitution created.’”229 In essence, the right to ingress and egress ex-
ists despite a complete lack of direct constitutional support.230
The Court’s evolving analysis regarding the scope of a right to 
travel evinces a clear case of ghost righting. Unwritten rights on an 
individualized level arise from the very structure of the Constitu-
                                                   
 226. Att’y Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 902 (1986) (emphasis added). As in 
Guest, the Court again considered and rejected enshrining the right specifically in the com-
merce clause (as well as in the Fourteenth Amendment). Id. at 902–03. As Justice Brennan 
opined, “the important role that [the right to travel] has played in transforming many States 
into a single Nation” precluded any need to textually base it. Id. at 902. 
 227. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500–03 (1999) (holding that the right to travel “protects 
the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave another State, the right to be treated 
as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second 
State, and, for those travelers who elect to become permanent residents, the right to be 
treated like other citizens of that State”). 
 228. Id. at 498; see also Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 902 (emphasis added).  
 229. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 501 (citing United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966)). An 
alternative view related to the Court’s observation in this regard relates to its recognition 
that the right to ingress and egress extends from the prior structural relationship between 
the states that preceded constitutional framing. To this end, the right to ingress and egress 
is not so much about its “ghostly” presence within the Constitution, but the Court’s ac-
knowledgment it preceded the development of the Constitution entirely. Even if this view is 
partially true, the Court attributes the right to constitutional structural facets.  
 230. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972) (“[Walking, 
strolling, and wandering] are historically part of the amenities of life as we have known 
them. They are not mentioned in the Constitution or in the Bill of Rights. These unwritten 
amenities have been in part responsible for giving our people the feeling of independence 
and self-confidence, the feeling of creativity.”); see also Timothy Baldwin, The Constitutional 
Right to Travel: Are Some Forms of Transportation More Equal Than Others?, 1 NW. J.L. & SOC.
POL. 213, 254 (2006) (“Justice Douglas sought to protect the act of walking, even if it is not 
mentioned in the Constitution or in the Bill of Rights.”) (citation omitted). 
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tion with manifold public health ramifications. Recognition of 
constitutional rights to ingress and egress necessitate balancing in-
dividual and communal interests across diverse policies related to 
sex offender registries, juvenile curfews, drug and gun free exclu-
sion zones, and emergency evacuations/relocations.231 The Court 
has shown particular disdain for state-based residency require-
ments to acquire health or other benefits. In Shapiro v. Thompson 
(1969),232 it disfavors a one-year residency requirement for persons 
in the District of Columbia to become welfare eligible.233 Later, in 
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County (1974),234 it strikes down an Ar-
izona statute mandating a one-year residency to garner non-
emergency medical care at government’s expense.235
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PUBLIC HEALTH
Theoretic and applied principles of constitutional cohesion broad-
en the range of arguments to address identifiable vices of govern-
ment which the Constitution is designed to obviate or remedy. As 
Professor Sunstein recognizes, “the American Constitution has 
come to be interpreted in ways that depart from its original mean-
ing.”236 In essence, “[t]he Constitution means what the Supreme 
Court says that it means.”237 Under this view, cohesive principles are 
significantly illustrated in multiple contexts. Infringements of 
rights may intervene to derail improper exercises of public health 
powers. Structural arguments may slice through misplaced or ag-
gressive use of powers to promote communal health. Constitution-
ally-grounded positive and negative rights may be inferred from 
the identification of governmental vices. Auxiliary or creative right-
                                                   
 231. See generally Rebecca Eaton, Escape Denied: The Gretna Bridge and the Government’s 
Armed Blockade in the Wake of Katrina, 13 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 127 (2006); Larry E. Gee, 
Federalism Revisited: The Supreme Court Resurrects the Notion of Enumerated Powers by Limiting Con-
gress’s Attempt to Federalize Crime, 27 ST. MARY’S L.J. 151, 182 (1995); Kathryn E. Wilhelm, Free-
dom of Movement at a Standstill? Toward the Establishment of a Fundamental Right to Intrastate 
Travel, 90 B.U.L. REV. 2461 (2010).  
 232. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
 233. See id. at 642 (“[The] Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits Con-
gress from denying public assistance to poor persons otherwise eligible solely on the ground 
that they have not been residents of the District of Columbia for one year at the time their 
applications are filed.”). 
 234. 415 U.S. 250 (1974). 
 235. See id. at 251, 253 (upholding the right to travel, in addition to guarding against 
government malfeasance, the Court sympathized with the plight of an impaired indigent 
needing access to medical care). 
 236. Sunstein, supra note 157, at 11. “I have emphasized that the meaning of the Ameri-
can Constitution changes because of new interpretations. If the Constitution meant, in all 
respects, what it originally meant, American constitutional rights would be thin indeed.” Id.
at 19. 
 237. Id. at 5. 
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ing presents novel approaches to generate (or limit) rights-based 
objections to substantial legal threats to public health. 
The ethereal concept of ghost righting, however, manifests 
something more. Though its applications are few, it provides a 
route for addressing governmental vices (oppression, overreach-
ing, tyranny, malfeasance) captured in the spirit of the Constitu-
tion, but not necessarily its text.238 At a minimum, ghost righting 
provides a way for the Court to justify its assessments of inherent 
rights untethered to textual guideposts. Most rights are enumerat-
ed or derived from penumbras of various rights fashioned by the 
Court based on the Framers’ perceptions or its own volition.239 Yet, 
some select rights are “conceived” solely because they are a “neces-
sary concomitant” of the principles for which the Constitution 
stands.240 And, like enumerated, auxiliary, or creative rights, ghost 
rights carry an imprimatur of constitutional weight, meaning, and 
enforcement.241
At its apex, ghost righting may help usher in a new constitution-
al right to public health. Judicial recognition of this right, however, 
faces considerable challenges. Exploration of the possible dimen-
sions of the right begins with a recognition of (1) its legal shadows 
already entrenched in Supreme Court parlance; (2) “rights to 
health” principles enveloped in human rights, foreign and domes-
tic constitutions, and other laws; and (3) opposition to navigating 
new, unenumerated rights through courts traditionally reluctant to 
recognize them.242 For a pathway to emerge, the right to public 
health must be couched narrowly on assuring uniform protections 
                                                   
 238. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
299 (1998) (“If rights can be unenumerated, is it possible to imagine entire constitutional 
amendments that are unwritten?”). 
 239. See Sunstein, supra note 157, at 15. 
 240. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 501 (1999). 
 241. Professor Sager argues that just because a specific right may not be recognized fully, 
or “underenforced” as he describes it, does not mean it lacks constitutional support. The 
Supreme Court may lack the fortitude to have carved out a specific constitutional require-
ment based on institutional limitations, but government actors may still observe it. As he 
notes “government officials have a legal obligation to obey an underenforced constitutional 
norm which extends beyond its interpretation by the federal judiciary to the full dimensions 
of the concept which the norm embodies.” This may require “governmental officials to fash-
ion their own conceptions of these norms and measure their conduct by reference to these 
conceptions.” Sager, supra note 90, at 1227. 
 242. Professor Sunstein attributes this failure in part to specific Justices appointed to the 
Court during an era of conservatism that militated against expansion of rights consistent 
with social and economic guarantees. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 157, at 5 (“[W]ith a 
modest shift in personnel, the Constitution would have been understood to create social 
and economic rights of the sort recognized in many modern constitutions.”). Sunstein ulti-
mately concludes “that judicial interpretation of the law, including the Constitution, has a 
great deal to do with the political commitments of the judges. The realist explanation stress-
es that American constitutional law is, to a considerable degree, a form of common law, 
based on analogical reasoning.” Id. at 19–20. 
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of basic public health services without the constant specter of legis-
lative or executive diminution. 
A. Shadows of the Right 
Unlike citizens of industrialized nations that long ago embraced 
universal health care,243 most Americans do not enjoy access to 
basic health services via governmental duties. Some Americans, 
however, do have a legitimate constitutional claim to these services. 
The shadow of a ghost right to public health is cast in the Court’s 
recognition of governmental obligations to protect the health of 
specific populations, particularly prisoners and other wards of the 
state. Denying medical services to prisoners is an affront to human 
dignity244 in violation of the Eighth Amendment.245 Consistent with 
substantive liberty interests, government must also provide appro-
priate medical care for persons involuntarily committed or con-
fined via quarantine, isolation, or for mental health purposes.246
The Court, however, historically refuses to interpret the Consti-
tution as including anything approaching a positive right to health 
for all. In the aforementioned decision, Memorial Hospital v. Mari-
copa County (1974),247 it identifies health care as a “basic necessity of 
life,”248 but clarifies three years later in Maher v. Roe (1977)249 that 
“[t]he Constitution imposes no obligation on the States to pay” for 
indigent medical expenses.250 Subsequently, the Court finds that 
due process confers no specific rights to governmental aid for af-
fected individuals251 or impacted third parties.252 Principles of equal 
protection support nondiscriminatory access to governmental 
                                                   
 243. See, e.g., LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, GLOBAL HEALTH LAW 263 (2014) (noting that 
Chile’s 1925 constitution included a right to health). 
 244. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 511 (2011) (holding that prison overcrowding leading 
to improper mental health care is a violation of the Eighth Amendment). 
 245. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 (1976) (“Deliberate indifference by prison per-
sonnel to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury constitutes cruel and unusual punishment 
contravening the Eighth Amendment.”). 
 246. Youngberg v. Romero, 457 U.S. 307, 314–25 (1982) (holding the Fourteenth 
Amendment ensures reasonably safe conditions of confinement, freedom from unreasona-
ble bodily restraints, and such minimally adequate training as reasonably might be required 
by these interests). 
 247. 415 U.S. 250, 269–70 (1974) (striking down an Arizona state law requiring residen-
cy status for access to publicly-funded medical care as a right to travel violation); see discus-
sion supra Part III.C. 
 248. Id. at 259. 
 249. 432 U.S. 464, 469–80 (1977) (finding that the Equal Protection Clause did not re-
quire a state to pay Medicaid expenses incident to nontherapeutic abortions for indigent 
women simply because it had made a policy choice to pay expenses incident to childbirth). 
 250. Id. at 469. 
 251. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty., Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989). 
 252. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005). 
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medical services,253 but do not actually require government to fund 
services in the first place.254 Absent recognition of an affirmative 
right to health, courts have allowed government to deny access to 
certain medical treatments255 and reject claims against parties al-
leged to have committed human rights abuses (including viola-
tions of rights to health) abroad.256
Given the jurisprudential black hole regarding access to health 
services for all Americans,257 proposals have arisen for federal con-
stitutional or congressional recognition258 of globally-developed 
concepts on the “right to health.”259 In his State of the Union ad-
dress on January 11, 1944, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
listed within his prospective Second Bill of Rights “[t]he right to 
adequate medical care and the opportunity to achieve and enjoy 
good health.260 His vision has never been realized domestically, but 
multiple other countries explicitly provide for a right to health in-
clusive of basic public health services and medical care.261 Varying 
                                                   
 253. See Tom Stacy, The Courts, the Constitution, and a Just Distribution of Health Care, 3 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 77, 83 (1993).  
 254. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 n.20 (1980) (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 
464, 469 (1977)) (“The Constitution imposes no obligation on the [government] to pay the 
pregnancy-related medical expenses of indigent women, or indeed to pay any of the medical 
expenses of indigents.”)). 
 255. In Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695 
(D.C. Cir. 2007), the court held that terminally ill persons have no constitutional right to 
acquire drugs not yet fully approved by FDA. In Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), the Su-
preme Court denied access to medicinal cannabis to patients seeking it under California 
state law as the drug remains unlawful via the federal Controlled Substances Act. 
 256. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 118, 124 (2013). In 2018, the Court 
denied access to courts for similar suits against foreign corporations. See Jesner v. Arab Bank, 
PLC, 200 L. Ed. 2d 612, 632, 636 (2018). 
 257. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Wing, The Right to Health Care in the United States, 2 ANNALS OF 
HEALTH L. 161, 161 (1993) (“There is nothing that can be characterized . . . as a constitu-
tional right to health care in the United States. The federal Constitution does not require 
any level of government to provide for or maintain the health of the population as a whole 
or any portion of it; there are a few circumstances under which an individual can make a 
constitutionally-based claim for a health or medical benefit, but these circumstances are rare 
and the use of the term ‘right to health care’ in reference to them would be both misleading 
and inappropriate.”). 
 258. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 30, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 259. Gostin, supra note 24; Sunstein, supra note 157, at 1–2. 
 260. See Sunstein, supra note 157, at 2 (citing President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to 
Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 11, 1944) in 13 THE PUBLIC PAPERS & ADDRESSES 
OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 40–42 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1950)). 
 261. Many of these constitutional provisions are based on similar concepts within the 
Universal Declaration for Human Rights. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, at 71 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. UDHR Article 25 explicitly pro-
claims that everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-
being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and 
necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, 
disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his con-
trol. Id. at 76. Additional human rights norms resonate similar language and principles, in-
cluding the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). See, 
e.g., GOSTIN, supra note 243, at 68. 
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rights to health have been recognized in over 130 constitutions or 
human rights documents262 based on multiple human rights trea-
tises.263
Several American states also acknowledge health rights in some 
way through their constitutions.264 New York’s constitution provides 
that “[t]he protection and promotion of the health of the inhabit-
ants of the state are matters of public concern.”265 Hawaii’s consti-
tutional language is even stronger: “[t]he State shall provide for 
the protection and promotion of the public health.”266 Though 
purposeful, these provisions fall short of enunciating a clear right 
to public health.267 Even though the New Jersey state constitution 
prioritizes “the preservation of health,” the state’s highest court 
observes that it “does not guarantee explicitly a fundamental right 
to health.”268 Montana’s constitution conveys that “[a]ll persons . . . 
have certain inalienable rights [including] . . . to . . . [seek] 
their . . . health . . . in all lawful ways.”269 Montana’s Supreme Court, 
however, refuses to interpret this language as sustaining an affirm-
ative, enforceable right to health.270
Some advocates have unsuccessfully proposed state constitution-
al amendments to solidify positive rights to health care.271 Even 
some local jurisdictions espouse the critical need for base levels of 
public health and health services. In 2019, New York City Mayor 
Bill de Blasio committed $100 million of local resources for medi-
                                                   
 262. GOSTIN, supra note 243, at 263. 
 263. Id. at 243–54 (describing UDHR, ICESCR, and the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR)). Some countries’ constitutional provisions guarantee ele-
ments or determinants of health, such as Ecuador, where “water, food, education, sports, 
work, and social security” are enumerated rights. Id. at 264. Other nations ensure a right to 
all-encompassing, holistic health for all citizens. Kenya’s constitution provides a right “to the 
highest attainable standard of health.” Id. The Dominican Republic includes a “comprehen-
sive right to health.” Id. at 263. 
 264. See, e.g., E. W. Leonard, State Constitutionalism and the Right to Health Care, 12(5) J.
CONST. L. 1335, 1347, 1406 (2010). 
 265. N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 3. 
 266. HAW. CONST. art. IX, § 1. 
 267. Leonard, supra note 264, at 1348. 
 268. N.J. CONST., art. 1, ¶ 1 (recognizing “certain natural and unalienable rights,” in-
cluding “life and liberty . . . safety and happiness”); Horizon Health Ctr. v. Felicissimo, 638 
A.2d 1260, 1269 (N.J. 1994). 
 269. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3 (1972). 
 270. See, e.g., Simms v. Mont. Eighteenth Judicial Dist. Court, 68 P.3d 678, 682 (Mont. 
2003); see also Mich. Universal Health Care Action Network v. State, No. 261400, 2005 Mich. 
App. LEXIS 2929, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2005) (rejecting imposing a duty on the 
legislature to establish a plan for greater access to health services).  
 271. See, e.g., Kathrin Rüegg, Embedding the Human Right to Health Care in U.S. State Consti-
tutions, NAT’L ECON. & SOC. RTS INITIATIVE, (2009), https://www.nesri.org/sites/default/
files/Constitutional_amendment_report.pdf. The effects of these constitutional platitudes 
on public health promotion are not well known; one 2015 study links stronger state right to 
health provisions and subsequent decreases in infant mortality. Hiroaki Matsuura, State Con-
stitutional Commitment to Health and Health Care and Population Health Outcomes: Evidence from 
Historic US Data, 105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, e48, e53 (2015). 
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cal care of undocumented persons and others unqualified for 
health coverage.272 Still, a right to public health in America is more 
mirage than reality. 
B. Judicial Navigation 
Neither shadows of health rights for specific populations nor as-
pirational rights language in presidential speeches or state consti-
tutions leads to recognition of a fundamental right to public 
health. This right must be generated at a higher level of constitu-
tional parlance grounded in the judiciary’s unique capacity to craft 
new rights to address known vices. Navigating this path is daunting. 
The Supreme Court has long expressed a strong reluctance to rec-
ognize new constitutional norms for manifold reasons grounded in 
legal theory, political science (notably among its conservative 
members), and its own established limits. Accordingly, the Court 
has expressed substantial concerns about actively expanding rights 
or reading new obligations into the Constitution regardless of the 
magnitude of interests at stake.273
On January 9, 2019, for example, the Court heard oral argu-
ments in Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt.274 An aggrieved 
plaintiff sued California tax authorities in a Nevada state court. His 
counsel argues that the Framers support his right to sue another 
state. In oral arguments, Justice Sotomayor retorts, “[i]t’s nice that 
[the Framers] felt that way, but what we know is that they didn’t 
put it into the Constitution.”275 Constitutional text and its meaning 
equally concern Justice Alito: “We are always very vigilant to read 
things into the Constitution that can’t be found in the text.”276 Jus-
tice Kavanaugh characterizes the Constitution as a document of 
“majestic specificity,”277 consistent with his views expressed before 
his ascendancy to the Court in October 2018.278
                                                   
 272. J. David Goodman, Free Health Care for the Uninsured Under Mayor’s $100 Million Plan,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2019, at A19. 
 273. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30 (1973) (“[T]he 
importance of a service performed by the State does not determine whether it must be re-
garded as fundamental for purposes of examination under the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
 274. 139 S. Ct. 1485 (2019) (presenting an opportunity for the Court to reconsider its 
longstanding precedent allowing states to be sued by parties in courts of other states). 
 275. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485 
(2019) (No. 17-1299), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1299; see also Adam Liptak, Ne-
vada Man v. California, But in Which State’s Court?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2019, at A16. 
 276. Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 
1485 (2019) (No. 17-1299), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1299. 
 277. Id. at 20. 
 278. As the newest member of the Court, Justice Kavanaugh brings an understanding of 
how structural principles protect individual rights. He states in a 2017 lecture to the Ameri-
can Enterprise Institute that “[t]he framers believed that in order to protect individual liber-
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Prior opinions reflect the Court’s circumspection over identify-
ing or crafting new fundamental rights,279 especially positive rights 
necessitating government action.280 Concerning due process rights, 
for example, Chief Justice Roberts opines how the Court has “con-
sistently refused to allow litigants to convert the shield provided by 
constitutional liberties into a sword to demand positive entitle-
ments from the State.”281 In the Court’s wisdom, new rights should 
be crafted via constitutional amendment or by Congress,282 and not 
by activist jurists283 for several reasons: 
                                                   
ty, power should not be concentrated in one person or one institution.” Brett Kavanaugh, 
From the Bench: The Constitutional Statesmanship of Chief Justice William Rehnquist, AM.
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, 1–2 (2017). Separation of powers and federalism, notes Kavanaugh, 
“are not mere matters of etiquette or architecture, but are essential to protecting individual 
liberty.” Brett M. Kavanaugh, Keynote Address: Two Challenges for the Judge as Umpire: Statutory 
Ambiguity and Constitutional Exceptions, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1907, 1909 (2017) [hereinaf-
ter Two Challenges for the Judge as Umpire]. Prior to ascending to the Court, Justice Kavanaugh 
wrote: “the Framers understood that a bill of rights without a structure to protect those 
rights would be largely meaningless.” Brett M. Kavanaugh, Our Anchor for 225 Years and 
Counting: The Enduring Significance of the Precise Text of the Constitution, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1907, 1909 (2014). However, his conception of liberty is framed around “freedom from gov-
ernment regulation,” and not positive rights. Kavanaugh, Two Challenges for the Judge as Um-
pire, supra, at 1916. His approach to unenumerated rights is similarly constrained. He lauds 
the late Chief Justice William Rehnquist for “his view that unenumerated rights could be 
recognized by the courts only if the asserted right was rooted in the nation’s history and tra-
dition.” Brett Kavanaugh, From the Bench: The Constitutional Statesmanship of Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, AM. ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, 16 (2017). Amending the Constitution is the only way 
to change the profile of constitutional rights. Otherwise, courts would be “snatching that 
constitutional or legislative authority for themselves.” Id. at 4. 
 279. See, e.g., Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (“There are risks when the 
judicial branch gives enhanced protection to certain substantive liberties without the guid-
ance of the more specific provisions of the Bill of Rights. As the history of the Lochner era 
demonstrates, there is reason for concern lest the only limits to such judicial intervention 
become the predilections of those who happen at the time to be Members of this Court.”).
 280. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989) 
(“[O]ur cases have recognized that the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative 
right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or 
property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual.”). Litigant 
attempts to characterize positive rights as mere negative rights may be rebuffed. See, e.g.,
Gary B. v. Snyder, 329 F. Supp. 3d 344, 364–65 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (“[T]he allegations state 
the violation of a negative right. But a violation of negative rights is not what the Complaint 
truly seems to argue. . . . Complaint points exclusively to a positive-right argument: Plaintiffs 
are entitled to a minimum level of instruction on learning to read, yet the State, vis-à-vis De-
fendants, has failed to give it to them. The Court will therefore construe the Complaint in 
that manner.”). 
 281. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2620 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
 282. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (holding that a double-bond 
prerequisite for appealing FED action does violate the equal protection clause the Court 
stated “the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill. 
We are unable to perceive . . . any constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a par-
ticular quality . . . Absent constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate housing and 
the definition of landlord-tenant relationships are legislative, not judicial, functions.”). 
 283. See, e.g., Martin A. Schwartz, Due Process and Fundamental Rights, 17 TOURO L. REV.
237, 237 (2016) (“In more recent years, the Supreme Court has consistently expressed its 
reluctance to expand the doctrine of substantive due process, claiming that it poses a threat 
to the legitimacy of the Court’s decision-making processes.”). Justice Thomas has rebuked 
the Court for favoring “judicially created rights” over “rights actually enumerated in the 
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(1) appointed, non-accountable284 judges should not su-
perimpose their positions on society under principles 
of representative democracy;285
(2)  adjudicating such rights devalues political debates, 
particularly at state and local levels;286
(3)  courts cannot address unanticipated consequences or 
problems emanating from newly-recognized rights;287
and
(4)  rights have an aura of permanency that can exceed 
expectations or be hard to undo or adapt.288
Grassroots recognition of expansive new rights or duties among 
lower courts may fare no better. Over the last decade, federal 
courts have rejected calls to recognize (a) duties to protect public 
                                                   
Constitution.” See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2329 (2016) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). Alternatively, Justice Kennedy opined in Schuette v. Coal. to Defend 
Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. 291 (2014) that arguments favoring judicial solutions to complex 
policies are:  
inconsistent with the underlying premises of a responsible, functioning democra-
cy. One of those premises is that a democracy has the capacity—and the duty—to 
learn from its past mistakes; to discover and confront persisting biases; and by re-
spectful, rational deliberation to rise above those flaws and injustices. That pro-
cess is impeded, not advanced, by court decrees based on the proposition that the 
public cannot have the requisite repose to discuss certain issues.  
Id. at 312–13. 
 284. See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2624 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Those who found-
ed our country . . . would never have imagined yielding . . . on a question of social policy to 
unaccountable and unelected judges.”).
 285. See id. at 2612 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Five lawyers have closed the debate and 
enacted their own vision of marriage as a matter of constitutional law.”); Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today’s opinion is the product of a Court, 
which is the product of a law-profession culture, that has largely signed on to the so-called 
homosexual agenda.”).
 286. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (“By extending constitu-
tional protection to an asserted right or liberty interest, we, to a great extent, place the mat-
ter outside the arena of public debate and legislative action.”).
 287. See id. at 720 (“But we have always been reluctant to expand the concept of substan-
tive due process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area 
are scarce and open-ended.”) (internal citation omitted). Contra Erwin Chemerinsky, Wash-
ington v. Glucksberg Was Tragically Wrong, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1501 (2008). See also Obergefell,
135 S. Ct. at 2625 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Federal courts are blunt instruments when it 
comes to creating rights. . . . [T]hey do not have the flexibility of legislatures to address con-
cerns of parties not before the court or to anticipate problems that may arise.”). 
 288. See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2624 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“But those whose 
views do not prevail . . . can gear up to raise the issue later, hoping to persuade enough on 
the winning side to think again. That is exactly how our system of government is supposed 
to work.”) (internal citation omitted); see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 604–05 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (“One of the benefits of leaving regulation of this matter to the people rather than to 
the courts is that the people, unlike judges, need not carry things to their logical conclu-
sion.”).  
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school students against onsite gun violence289 or offsite physical 
abuse;290 (b) requirements to act to prevent further harms from 
gun-related violence in a private nightclub;291 (c) rights to primary 
or secondary education;292 (d) rights to higher education;293 or (e) 
“rights to literacy.”294
C. Parameters of the Right 
Against this backdrop, judicial recognition of a right to public 
health necessitates precision crafting along a narrow constitutional 
route. Clearly, it cannot be framed in terms of a generalized right 
to health services guaranteeing individual health care coverage for 
all. The Supreme Court has considered and rejected this notion.295
Nor is it about assuring all Americans are free from the threats of 
communicable diseases, chronic conditions, or avoidable injuries. 
As noted initially, these are aspirational goals, not parameters for 
constitutional rights. 296
As illustrated in Figure 4, consistent with constitutional infer-
ences,297 recognizing new, unenumerated rights starts with the 
                                                   
 289. L.S. v. Peterson, No. 18-cv-61577, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210273, at *10–12 (S.D. Fla. 
Dec. 12, 2018) (finding that law enforcement officials did not violate the due process clause 
by not intervening during the Parkland, Florida school shooting); Adeel Hassan, Officers 
Don’t Have Duty to Help, U.S. Judge Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2018, at A19. 
 290. See Doe v. Covington Cty. Sch. Dist., 675 F.3d 849, 855–56 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding 
that the special relationship between students and public schools does not create a constitu-
tional duty to ensure student safety related to violence outside the school, notably molesta-
tion by a person pretending to be the student’s father).  
 291. Vielma v. Gruler, 347 F. Supp. 3d 1122, 1131 (M.D. Fla. 2018) (finding no due pro-
cess violation related to an officer who failed to enter a nightclub to neutralize a shooter 
who went on to murder forty-nine people and injure fifty-three others concluding that due 
process does not include an affirmative right to government aid, even when it may be neces-
sary to secure otherwise protected rights). 
292. Martinez v. Malloy, 350 F. Supp. 3d 74 (D. Conn. 2018). Contra Complaint at 2, A.C. 
v. Raimondo, No. 1:18-cv-645 (D.R.I. Nov. 18, 2018) (awaiting decision on similar right to 
education claims).  
 293. Salau v. Denton, 139 F. Supp. 3d 989, 1004 (W.D. Mo. 2015) (rejecting a University 
of Missouri student’s due process claims arising from a disciplinary proceeding on the 
grounds that a violation could not proceed because there is no constitutionally protected 
right to a public college education); see also Simms v. Pa. State Univ., No. 3:17-cv-201, 2018 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45051, at *13–14 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2018) (finding no right to a college 
education where a Penn State student faced disciplinary and criminal charges after an on-
campus altercation). 
 294. Gary B. v. Snyder, 329 F. Supp. 3d 344, 366 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (holding children do 
not have a right of access to literacy under the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment because the clause does not “demand that a state affirmatively provide each 
child with a defined, minimum level of education by which the child can attain literacy”); see 
also Jacey Fortin, Judge Rejects Detroit Students’ Lawsuit Ruling “Adequate Education” Is Not a 
Right, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 5, 2018, at A11. 
 295. See supra Part IV.A. 
 296. See supra Part IV.A. 
 297. See supra Introduction. 
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identification of a known vice for which a constitutional solution 
may follow. Structural principles may suffice to stymie generalized 
vices. Generating more specific remedies tied to some identified 
vices requires consideration of auxiliary, creative, or ghost rights. 
In any of these scenarios, courts may presumably craft either posi-
tive (+) or negative (-) rights. Thus, there are at least twenty-four 
distinct options for generating a right to public health presuming a 
vice is identified. Given extreme judicial reticence in the modern 
era to directly recognize positive rights,298 realistic, viable options 
for a right to public health lie among the twelve remaining options 
centered on the recognition of negative rights to counter specific 
vices.
FIGURE 4. RIGHTS OPTIONS EXTENDING FROM 
CONSTITUTIONAL INFERENCES
The premier question is whether a national failure to provide 
routine, efficacious population health services implicates a consti-
tutional vice for which a remedy must flow.299 Clearly, it does.300
                                                   
 298. See supra Part IV.B. 
 299. That remedies flow from identified constitutional vices is analogous to concomitant 
remedies for specific wrongs arising from tort law and policy. See, e.g., Curlender v. Bio-Sci. 
Labs., 106 Cal. App. 3d 814, 830 (1980) (citing Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 178 (Cal. 
1967)) (“[W]e have long adhered to the principle that there should be a remedy for every 
wrong committed. ‘Fundamental in our jurisprudence is the principle that for every wrong 
there is a remedy and that an injured party should be compensated for all damage proxi-
mately caused by the wrongdoer.’”).  
 300. See Hodge, Jr., supra note 121, at 310 (“There is perhaps no facet of governmental 
regulation more important to the public welfare than the maintenance of public health . . . 
American public health law is as old as the formation of the colonies themselves. It owes its 
early origins to the need of colonial governments to protect the public health for the literal 
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Professor Amar asserts that the Constitution mandates the provi-
sion of “minimal entitlements” including sustenance and other 
basic services, plausibly including public health protections.301 He 
frames entitlements largely in the realm of property interests 
grounded in affirmative requirements under the Thirteenth 
Amendment, among other claims. “[W]hether we begin with a vi-
sion of individual dignity and human rights, or . . . stress the struc-
tural requirements of . . . government, we are led to the idea of 
guaranteed minimal entitlements,”302 including minimum suste-
nance and shelter.303
So why doesn’t the Constitution expressly address these entitle-
ments? Professor Parmet purports that the Framers’ expectation 
that government protect the public’s health obviated any need for 
express constitutional language authorizing public health services 
or powers.304 “The assertion that the framers assumed a public 
health obligation on the part of government,” notes Parmet, “is 
surprisingly compatible with modified versions of [Lockean or re-
publican] theories, and may even highlight the ways in which the 
framing generation interwove theories that, considered abstractly, 
appear antagonistic.”305 That governments, notably sovereign states 
or tribes, hold inherent306 and irrevocable307 public health powers is 
                                                   
survival of the community . . . Public health law then was as much a necessary practice as it 
was a governmental responsibility.”). 
 301. Akhil Reed Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule: A Republican Theory of Minimal Entitlements,
13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 37 (1990). 
 302. Id. at 43. 
 303. Id. at 39. 
 304. Wendy E. Parmet, Health Care and the Constitution: Public Health and the Role of the 
State in the Framing Era, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 267, 270–71 (1993) (“[U]nderstanding of 
public health law in the framing era may have comported with the political theories preva-
lent at the time, especially liberalism, republicanism, and social contract theory.”).  
 305. Id. at 306. 
 306. The role of government to protect the public’s health has been affirmed by the Su-
preme Court for hundreds of years. In early cases like Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824), the 
Court accepted that states and localities have a fundamental role in protecting public 
health. Id. at 178–79. See also Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 280 (2006) (referring to 
states’ “police powers to legislate as to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and 
quiet of all persons”) (internal citation omitted); McDonald v. City of Chicago., 561 U.S. 
742, 901 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he ability to respond to the social ills associat-
ed with dangerous weapons goes to the very core of the States’ police powers.”). In Phalen v. 
Virginia, 49 U.S. 163 (1850), the Court stated that “the suppression of nuisances injurious to 
public health or morality is among the most important duties of government.” Id. at 168. In 
Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951), the Court said in dicta that “[t]he police 
power of a state extends beyond health, morals and safety, and comprehends the duty, with-
in constitutional limitations, to protect the well-being and tranquility of a community.” Id. at 
640 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).
 307. See, e.g., Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 819 (1880) (“No legislature can bargain 
away the public health or the public morals. The people themselves cannot do it, much less 
their servants. The supervision of both these subjects of governmental power is continuing 
in its nature, and they are to be dealt with as the special exigencies of the moment may re-
quire. Government is organized with a view to their preservation, and cannot divest itself of 
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largely a given helps explain the absence of affirmative constitu-
tional language effectuating public health protections. The Fram-
ers did not need to state what is obvious—that government must 
act in the interests of societal health. 
This constitutional absence, however, does not resolve whether 
the federal government has a distinct role in public health promo-
tion. To the contrary, principles of federalism suggest (at least in 
theory) that reserving sovereign police powers to the states 
through the Tenth Amendment may actually negate a federal role 
in protection of the public’s health. That is, to the extent police 
powers used historically and primarily to protect the public’s 
health are allotted to the states, there must be little to no role or 
responsibility for the federal government to intervene in the same 
sphere.308
Even if this premise pervaded early judicial conceptions, cumu-
lative assessments of federalism recognize that the division of fed-
eral and state powers is by no means a clean split.309 Federal and 
state governments share significant responsibilities over an array of 
public duties, including public health.310 Expansive interpretations 
of federal commerce and tax powers during the New Deal era are 
often tied directly to the national government’s role in public 
health311 and the environment.312 Among a unified nation of states, 
the national role is essential to thwart eminent national public 
health threats and needs. In the modern era, the federal govern-
                                                   
the power to provide for them.”); see also New Orleans Gas Co. v. La. Light Co., 115 U.S. 650, 
668 (1885) (disallowing states from contractually limiting the exercise of police powers re-
lated to public health and the public morals. “The preservation of these [powers] is so nec-
essary to the best interests of social organization, that a wise policy forbids the legislative 
body to divest itself of the power to enact laws for the preservation of health and the repres-
sion of crime.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 308. This proposition is asserted by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in Jacobson v. 
Massachusetts. 197 U.S. 1(1905). See supra Part II.A. 
 309. See, e.g., PARMET, supra note 4, at 96–104 (examining the role of federalism in rela-
tion to different and overlapping responsibilities of federal and state governments to pro-
mote population health); see also Adam Babich, Our Federalism, Our Hazardous Waste, and Our 
Good Fortune, 54 MD. L. REV. 1516, 1532–33 (1995) (arguing that cooperative federalism al-
lows states continued power in the realm of public health while providing national protec-
tions under minimum federal standards). 
 310. See Erwin Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 62 
UCLA L. REV. 74, 116–19 (2015) (discussing the successes of cooperative federalism in the 
establishment of health care exchanges under the ACA, the Clean Water Act, and the Clean 
Air Act). 
 311. Alex Kreit & Aaron Marcus, Raich, Health Care, and the Commerce Clause, 31 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 957, 995 (2005) (overviewing the expansion of federal intervention in the 
public health arena during the 1900s).  
 312. See, e.g., PARMET, supra note 4, at 82 (“From the New Deal until the 1990s, the Su-
preme Court adopted a highly deferential stance toward both state and federal laws that ei-
ther appeared to protect public health or purported to do so.”); see also Hodge, Jr., supra
note 121, at 338 (explaining how the New Deal provided “fertile ground” for the growth of 
federal intervention into public health).  
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ment unquestionably possesses immense powers to address the 
public’s health.313 Declinations to adequately and uniformly wield 
these powers over time and across administrations contribute to 
negative health repercussions. 
Millions of Americans needlessly suffer each year from prevent-
able causes of morbidity and mortality across an array of physical 
and mental health conditions. The interests of individuals and the 
body politic in public health protections are intrinsic to every oth-
er right bestowed constitutionally.314 Yet, as Professor Gostin has el-
oquently espoused, no citizen, group, entity, or state can accom-
plish alone what the national government can assure collectively to 
protect the public’s health.315 Failure in this regard reflects more 
than poor political choices by an administration or legislative ex-
cuses framed as funding limitations. It is a constitutional vice tied 
most closely to malfeasance, notably government’s failure to act in 
the interests of the public’s health despite an obligation to do so.316
The Framers understood this essential role of government; the 
Court should acknowledge it as well. 
Constitutional recognition of a right to public health embodies 
a fundamental governmental responsibility to respect the essential 
public health needs of populations. It is about a national commit-
ment to properly balance government interests in protecting and 
promoting health across populations through efficacious public 
health interventions. Generating a constitutional remedy to ad-
dress the identified vice of national public health failures prompts 
three distinct possibilities. First, the Court could craft a right to 
public health from a patchwork of provisions as it has done previ-
ously through auxiliary rights to privacy or citizenship.317 Yet the 
Court has already signaled in prior jurisprudence and modern 
                                                   
313. See, e.g., GOSTIN, supra note 4, at 98 (“The federal government possesses considera-
ble authority to act and exerts extensive control in the realm of public health and safety.”);
see also Wendy K. Mariner et al., Jacobson v. Massachusetts: It’s Not Your Great-Grandfather’s Pub-
lic Health Law, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 581 (2005) (describing the important role the federal 
government plays in public health promotion). 
 314. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Mann et al., Health and Human Rights, in HEALTH AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS 7, 11–18 (Jonathan M. Mann et al. eds., 1999) (arguing that public health is essen-
tial to fulfilling the requirements of the International Bill of Human Rights, which parallel 
similar rights expressly and impliedly guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution). 
 315. See Lawrence O. Gostin, Mapping the Issues: Public Health, Law and Ethics, in PUBLIC 
HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS: A READER 2 (2d ed., 2010) (“Individuals can do a great deal to 
safeguard their health, particularly if they have the economic means to do so. . . . Yet there is 
a great deal that individuals cannot do to secure their health, and therefore these individu-
als need to organize and collaborate on building infrastructure and developing shared re-
sources. Acting alone, people cannot achieve environmental protection, hygiene and sanita-
tion, clean air and surface water, uncontaminated food and drinking water, safe roads and 
products, or control of infectious disease.”). 
 316. See supra Part I.D. 
 317. See supra Part III.A. 
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views its reticence to bring together bits and pieces of constitution-
al language to generate new wholesale rights. Textualists like Jus-
tices Thomas and Kavanaugh would likely object vehemently to the 
Court’s machinations in this regard.318
Second, the Court might reconsider its interpretation of rights 
to life or liberty under substantive due process in an exercise of 
creative righting.319 However, modern calls for the Court to amplify 
due process interests in other contexts unrelated to the public’s 
health have fallen flat. Through either auxiliary or creative right-
ing, tying a constitutional right to public health to a re-purposed 
interpretation of enumerated rights, or penumbras of such rights, 
only heightens the Court’s queasiness over expansions of fairly-
settled norms.320
By process of elimination, principles of ghost righting may ap-
pear as a final option to generate a right to public health. In reali-
ty, it is the premier route to effectuate the right. Remedying mal-
feasance embedded in national failures to act in the interests of 
the public’s health through ghost righting makes constitutional 
sense. Exercises of ghost righting allow for legitimate expansions of 
constitutional conceptions unmoored to existing provisions 
weighed down by decades of limitations. Unlike enumerated rights 
designed to inhibit explicit vices, ghost righting is premised on the 
need to address non-explicit ones. Even if the Framers recognized 
government’s role in protecting communal health, they could not 
have imagined how advancements in public health sciences and 
practices would vault such efforts beyond sovereign states to the 
national level. Members of every branch of government can now 
envision a defined public health role for the federal government, 
but too often selectively choose to ignore it. While the Constitution 
                                                   
 318. See, e.g., Two Challenges for the Judge as Umpire, supra note 278, at 1916; Nancie G. 
Marzulla, The Textualism of Clarence Thomas: Anchoring the Supreme Court’s Property Jurisprudence 
to the Constitution, 10 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 351, 683 (2002) (discussing Justice 
Thomas’ “fidelity to textualism and original intent”).  
 319. See supra Part III.B. 
 320. The Supreme Court’s reticence to play an overly-active role in adjudicating new 
rights or standards for national implementation is unquestionably a factor to the extent fed-
eral agencies may be well-positioned to respond via delegations of powers via Congress. See,
e.g., Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 428–29 (2011) (“[Federal executive 
agencies are] surely better equipped to [regulate greenhouse gases] than individual district 
judges issuing ad hoc, case-by-case injunctions. Federal judges lack the scientific, economic, 
and technological resources an agency can utilize in coping with issues of this order . . . . 
Judges may not commission scientific studies or convene groups of experts for advice, or 
issue rules under notice-and-comment procedures inviting input by any interested person, 
or seek the counsel of [State] regulators . . . . Rather, judges are confined by a record com-
prising the evidence the parties present. Moreover, federal district judges, sitting as sole ad-
judicators, lack authority to render precedential decisions binding other judges, even mem-
bers of the same court.”). 
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is not designed to remedy every last ill that Americans may suffer,321
it is capable of interpretations that alleviate harms only govern-
ment, particularly federal, can mend. Malfeasance embedded in 
national failures to protect the public’s health finds its cure in 
ghost righting. 
A right to public health is a distinct right embedded in the fab-
ric of a Constitution drafted with sufficient flexibility to allow its 
recognition as an essential role of government. It takes form most 
clearly as a negative right that government not impede absent suf-
ficient justification. What may constitute a “sufficient justification” 
for breaching a right to public health is subject to further adjudica-
tion, although it may clearly surpass a mere rational basis for fail-
ures to act under principles of substantive due process.322 Like most 
negative rights,323 however, it also requires something more than 
idle responses by governments to public health threats that impair 
individual or group entitlements to a healthier society.324 Delineat-
ing the contours and breadth of services owed to Americans via a 
ghost right to public health is reserved for further exploration pur-
suant to a suitable “case or controversy” persuasively arguing for its 
existence.325 For now, it is enough to chart a course for bringing a 
                                                   
 321. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 32 (1973) (quoting 
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972)) (“[T]he Constitution does not provide judicial 
remedies for every social and economic ill.”). 
 322. The Supreme Court’s treatment of claims expressing a right to education provides 
an apt example. Despite the Court’s reticence to recognize such rights in Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 
at 18, it later arguably employed a heightened form of scrutiny in invalidating a Texas stat-
ute that allowed local school districts to refuse schooling to undocumented kids in Plyler v. 
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 203 (1982). In Plyer, the Court stressed that a complete denial of educa-
tion to a suspect class requires “something more than a rational basis.” Id. at 235. 
 323. Parmet, supra note 304, at 331 (discussing the Framers’ views on public health and 
arguing that constitutional rights were not “purely negative” but dependent on reciprocal 
obligations). 
 324. The Supreme Court affirmed the need for positive government obligations in nega-
tively phrased rights. See Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1698 (2017) (citing 
Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 740 (1984)) (stating rights to equal protection can be 
remedied via a positive extension of benefits to excluded classes); see also Griffin v. Illinois, 
351 U.S. 12 (1956) (requiring the state to furnish an indigent with a free transcript of the 
trial); David P. Currie, Positive & Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864, 884 
(1986) (citing Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)) (“[T]he Court invoked not the 
right to counsel or due process but equal protection to hold that a state must provide coun-
sel to represent an indigent on appeal.”).  
 325. A case may potentially be framed consistent with plaintiffs’ claims in Juliana v. Unit-
ed States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1251 (D. Or. 2016). See discussion supra Part III.A. In Juliana,
plaintiffs allege substantial harms from the environment stemming from federal failures to 
address climate change over decades. Similarly-situated plaintiffs directly impacted by poor 
public health, environmentalists or outcomes unrelated to their specific behaviors or choic-
es may petition the government for remedies to address long-standing injuries and harms. 
As in Juliana, viable remedies may only flow if plaintiffs can demonstrate a federal constitu-
tional obligation. Plaintiffs in Juliana focus on an expansion of substantive due process to 
frame a “right to a climate system capable of sustaining human life.” Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d 
at 1251. In a future case centered on a right to public health, ghost righting presents a via-
ble option to an auxiliary righting route pursued in Juliana.
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principled case with the goal of generating a right that citizens are 
owed, and government must respect. 
CONCLUSION
Generating a constitutionally-viable argument for the existence 
of a right to public health by no means assures it will be recog-
nized. Odds against it may seem long. National politics focus more 
on assuring healthcare access than public health services. The pub-
lic is either unaware of or apathetic to base level public health ef-
forts. Industries directly lobby against public health services that 
tamp down sales or profits. Congress insufficiently funds responses 
to known public health threats like infectious diseases, opioid mis-
use, and obesity, as well as behind-the-scenes communal health 
services. The Supreme Court seems extremely reluctant to expand 
interpretations of existing rights, much less engage in ghost right-
ing to craft new duties on government. Yet, therein lies a key in 
this latter observation. A ghost right to public health is not about 
thrusting new duties onto government. Rather, it is about recogniz-
ing a duty that government always had, framed appropriately 
around a collective right owed to the public. 
Promoting and protecting the public’s health are not optional 
services. They are prime responsibilities for government at every 
level. The soundness of a right to public health extends from the 
reality that organized society absent these services is unhealthy and 
unsustainable. Effectuation of every other right citizens are owed, 
whether enumerated or not, starts first with their capacity to exer-
cise them. A right to public health makes that possible for every 
American, not just those who can afford a higher standard of liv-
ing. As the remedy for an identified vice, the right is about provid-
ing Americans an opportunity for improved communal health 
through sustained services applied equitably across populations na-
tionally.

